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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
Enhancing Node Cooperation in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes
In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), nodes depend on each other for routing and
forwarding packets. However, to save power and other resources, nodes belonging to
independent authorities may behave selfishly, and may not be willing to help other nodes.
Such selfish behavior poses a real threat to the proper functioning of MANETs.
One way to foster node cooperation is to introduce punishment for selfish nodes. Based
on neighbor-monitoring techniques, a fully distributed solution to detect, punish, and re-
admit selfish nodes, is proposed here. This solution provides nodes the same opportunity
to serve/and be served by others. A light-weight solution regarding battery status is also
proposed here. This solution requires neighbor monitoring only when necessary, thereby
saving nodes battery power.
Another effective way to solve the selfish-node problem is to reward nodes for their
service according to their cost. To force nodes to show their true cost, truthful protocols
are needed. A low overhead truthful routing protocol to find optimal routes is proposed
in this thesis. The most prominent feature of this protocol is the reduction of overhead
from existing solutions O(n3) to O(n2). A light-weight scalable truthful routing protocol
(LSTOP) is further proposed, which finds near-least-cost paths in dense networks. LSTOP
reduces overhead to O(n) on average, and O(n2) in worst case scenarios.
Multiple path routing protocols are an effective alternative to single path routing
protocols. A generic mechanism that can turn any table-driven multipath routing protocol
into a truthful one, is outlined here. A truthful multipath routing protocol (TMRP), based
on well-known AOMDV protocol, is presented as an example. TMRP incurs an only
2n message overhead for a route discovery, and can also achieve load balancing without
compromising truthfulness.
To cope with the selfish-node problem in the area of position-based routing, a truthful
geographic forwarding (TGF) algorithm is presented. TGF utilizes three auction-based
forwarding schemes to stimulate node cooperation. The truthfulness of these schemes
is proven, and their performance is evaluated through statistical analysis and simulation
studies.
KEYWORDS: Ad Hoc Networks, Selfish Nodes, Routing, Neighbor monitoring, Truth-
fulness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation addresses the node cooperation problem in wireless ad hoc networks with
selfish nodes. A fair distributed solution to detect and punish selfish nodes, together with
a light-weight solution considering battery status is first presented. Then, two routing
protocols, a low overhead truthful routing protocol and a light-weight scalable truthful
routing protocol to improve efficiency of truthful routing, are presented. Next, the paper
discusses a generic mechanism to turn any table-driven multipath routing protocol into a
truthful one. Finally, a truthful mechanism for position-based routing and forwarding is
presented in this thesis.
1.1 Ad Hoc Networks
With the rapid development of electronics and mobile computing devices, wireless data
communication is becoming more and more pervasive. Wireless networks are developed by
connecting these wireless devices, and a wireless network can range in size from as small as
a BAN (Body Area Network), which covers the transmission range of the human body, to
as large as wireless WANs (Wide Area Networks)[1]. In addition to providing the platform
for mobile computing, a wireless network provides connection to various resources such
as Internet services. The emergence of wireless networks satisfies the need for ubiquitous
computing by accessing information at any time and any place. For example, at Starbucks,
we can always see customers surfing the Internet while enjoying coffee. Among the various
wireless networks, some have the support of infrastructures. For example, cellular networks
are equipped with base stations, and wireless LANs are equipped with access points. Other
wireless networks are not facilitated by an infrastructure support system. These networks
are established for specific purposes, or in an ‘ad hoc’ manner, and thus are called ad hoc
networks.
A mobile ad hoc network is an autonomous system, whereby a set of nodes (entities),
which could be laptops or PDAs, are connected through wireless links. The system
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allows the seamless interconnection of entities in areas without preexisting infrastructures.
Without an infrastructure, ad hoc networks can be deployed rapidly, and were initially
used for scenarios where establishing an infrastructure was not feasible or economical,
such as disaster relief operations, emergency operations, and in the battlefield. It has
now been extended to civilian and commercial applications. A prototypical example is
mobile conferencing, where group of mobile users can establish an ad hoc network for
collaborative computing, using their laptops. Ad hoc networks can also be used as edge
networks to extend the coverage of cellular networks [2]. The potential applications of
ad hoc networks include home networking, Personal Area Networks, embedded computing
applications, sensor networks, and automotive interaction [1].
In general, mobile ad hoc networks share the following properties:
• Lack of infrastructure. In cellular networks, there are base stations and other
centralized servers such as mobile switch centers. However, in ad hoc networks, there
are no centralized entities in charge of network activities. Therefore, networking
functions have to be executed by nodes. For example, each node has to work as a
router for routing and data forwarding.
• Topology changes. In mobile ad hoc networks, mobility is inevitable. Nodes may move
together as a group in the same direction, or to the same destination, as soldiers move
on the battlefield. In most scenarios, nodes are more likely to move independently.
Nodes may also dynamically join, or leave, the network at any time. Due to the
mobility of nodes and their dynamic presence, the topology of the network link may
change rapidly and unpredictably.
• Scarcity of resource. Nodes in mobile ad hoc networks usually have limited resources,
such as battery power and bandwidth. While nodes in wired networks never take
power into consideration, battery power is a primary concern in mobile ad hoc
networks. Usually, the batteries in laptops last for only a couple of hours under normal
working conditions. Moreover, packet transmission is very energy consumptive, and
accelerates the depletion of battery power.
• Poor channel quality. Communication over wireless channels suffers from propagation
path loss, fading, and interference from other ongoing communications. Different
terrain contours and environments (city or rural, open space or inside office buildings),
have varying impact on path loss. Even the weather, i.e., sunny or rainy, has an effect.
The distance between two nodes is an important factor in channel quality, as received
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signal strength deteriorates exponentially with increased distance. Nodes within radio
range may interfere with each other. A more subtle problem is hidden nodes [3, 4]. In
one scenario, a node is sending packets to a second node. However, a third node, out
of radio range of the sending node but within the transmission range of the receiving
node, may simultaneously send out packets, thus destroying ongoing communications.
Mobile nodes also suffer from frequent link breaks.
• Multi-hop forwarding. Nodes have limited radio ranges to minimize required
transmission power. Usually the expanse of an ad hoc network is much larger than a
node’s transmission coverage. Therefore, multi-hop packet forwarding is necessary for
communication over the entire network range. In cellular networks or wireless LANs,
the base station and the access point can cover the entire network.
• Device heterogeneity. Mobile devices in ad hoc networks can exist in many forms,
such as laptops, PDAs, and cellular phones. These devices differ greatly in features
such as size, memory, power consumption, and processing ability [5].
1.2 Motivations
Routing and data forwarding are two basic functions of networks. In wired networks, routers
are in charge of routing and data forwarding, while in cellular networks base stations have
this responsibility. However, in mobile ad hoc networks, in the absence of dedicated routers
or base stations, nodes have to work as both routers and end systems. On one hand, these
nodes usually have limited radio power and can cover a very limited area. On the other hand,
the range of an ad hoc network can be quite large. Data communication therefore usually
involves multi-hops between nodes. In such a system, without the forwarding help of nodes,
communication beyond a node’s radio range is impossible. Most routing protocols assume
cooperative network settings, whereby nodes are willing to help each other by forwarding
packets without bias. The primary challenge of routing in such an environment is to cope
with node mobility, which, as has been noted, leads to frequently changing network topology.
Many routing protocols [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] have been
proposed for ad hoc networks. The key idea behind all of these protocols is to establish and
maintain loop-free paths to respective destinations, while achieving a good balance with
important performance metrics.
However, in some ad hoc networks, (and particularly civilian ones), such cooperation
cannot be assumed. In these ad hoc networks, nodes belong to different authorities and have
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their own priorities. In ad hoc networks, nodes have very limited resources, particularly
battery power. On the other hand, the transmission of packets is very power-consuming.
To expend this scarce resource on helping other nodes is not in a node’s best interests.
Thus a selfish node is not willing to forward data to other nodes freely, although it may
expect service from other nodes. A selfish node is distinct from a malicious node, which
intends to destroy the network or harm other nodes. When a minority of nodes engages
in selfish behavior, network performance will be degraded, but when the majority of nodes
exhibit selfish behavior, the collapse of the network may result. Thus selfish nodes pose a
real threat to the correct functioning of ad hoc networks.
1.2.1 Punishment Based Solutions
One way to solve the selfish nodes problem is to introduce a punishment mechanism to
force node cooperation. Nodes have the responsibility to help each other, i.e., they have to
forward packets upon request. Uncooperative nodes can be punished by being excluded from
the network. The key issue for such a mechanism is the design of an effective monitoring and
evaluation system to evaluate node forwarding performance, and to detect selfish behaviors.
A good punishment based solution should have the following features:
• In the absence of centralized servers in ad hoc networks, the solution (both detection
and evaluation tasks) should be distributed among nodes. Due to the properties
of wireless communication (such as packet collision and interference), a node can
not make accurate observations regarding other nodes. Thus, a single node’s
opinion/decision regarding conviction of another node cannot be relied upon.
• A selfish node should be identified and punished. Simply finding another route
that bypasses a suspicious selfish node is not enough to force cooperation, since it
encourages the selfish node not to forward packets.
• False conviction should be avoided, i.e., a cooperative node should not be convicted
of being selfish, and be punished. Avoiding false punishment is more important than
identifying all selfish nodes.
• A resource-depleting solution is not feasible. If excessive battery power and bandwidth
consumption are needed to identify selfish nodes, it may be enough to just identify
suspicious nodes. it is important to remember that a selfish node is not a malicious
node, as it just wants to save its resource, not destroy or attack others.
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A node’s selfishness is evaluated based on its forwarding behavior. However, nodes in
different positions in the network (particularly when the network is in a two dimensional
area) have different opportunities to serve, or be served by the network. Some nodes in
certain positions have obvious privilege over other nodes. This unfair utility of network is
known as the location privilege problem. Generally, routing algorithms select short routes
(ideally the shortest routes), and therefore routes are very likely to pass through the middle
of the network. Nodes located in the middle of the network have more opportunities to be
included in routes than those in the periphery. Nodes in the center area have to forward
more packets and therefore spend more resources than those in the periphery. In other
words, nodes in the periphery benefit from saving their resources. The evaluation of selfish
behavior should consider this problem.
1.2.2 Motivation Based Solutions
The selfish nodes problem can be countered by inducing these nodes to cooperate by
motivating them with incentives. This is diametrically opposed to the punishment approach.
All nodes are assumed to be selfish in nature and they have the choice to forward packets,
or not. But, why consume valuable power resources when nothing is received in return?
By being reimbursed for their forwarding cost, and even gaining bonuses, selfish nodes can
benefit from packet forwarding, and will be more willing to cooperate with other nodes.
Reimbursement is usually in the form of virtual money, which can be converted into real
money.
A natural question is how much a node should be paid. A simple way is to reimburse each
node equally for packet forwarding. However, expenditures vary among nodes for forwarding
the same packet, since they may use different emitting power and have different costs for
emitting power units. Also the cost of a node may vary over time due to its battery status.
For example, a node with low battery status is more likely to save the battery for its own use
than one with full battery status. Thus, it is desirable to reimburse nodes according to their
particular situation at any point in time. Meanwhile nodes getting forwarding services can
pay for these services with a reasonably low reimbursement. However, to maximize their
utility, selfish nodes may not divulge their true cost. This poses the requirement for truthful
protocols (strategies) to prevent cheating.
A protocol is truthful (or strategy-proof) if it maximizes the utility of nodes only when
they reveal their true cost. Truthful protocols are very useful in practice. For example, if
ad hoc networks are used as edge networks to extend coverage of access points, or cellular
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networks, truthful protocols provide the means for optimal payment to the forwarding
nodes.
In a truthful protocol, selfish nodes have no incentive to lie about their cost. Note
that the cost here refers to that of data packet transmission only. However, any routing
protocol produces control messages1 for route discovery and route maintenance. Since the
cost of overhead in terms of control messages incurred by such truthful protocols must also
be reimbursed, it is not desirable to reduce cost for data transmissions at the expense of
high overhead, in terms of control messages. If the overall overhead incurred exceeds the
savings for data packet transmission, there is no advantage to the truthful protocol. The
following example illustrates this point. There are 5 intermediate nodes between a given
source and a destination. Each intermediate node asks 5 cents for one packet forwarding
although its true cost (to forward one packet) is only 1 cent. If the source has 1000 packets
to send, it should pay 250 dollars for the service. With a truthful protocol, every node
will show its true cost, which is 1 cent. However, the protocol incurs an overhead of 500
dollars. Of course, as a rational node, the source just wants to pay what an intermediate
node asks. Thus controlling the overhead is as important as guaranteeing the truthfulness
for any practical protocol. Moreover, a lower overhead usually leads to higher network
performance.
Finding a truthful routing protocol for geographic routing is also a challenge. Topology-
based routing algorithms, such as AODV or DSR, usually invoke global route discoveries
to find routes from sources to destinations. Data packets will travel along the found paths.
However, typical geographic routing algorithms[23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29] do not have
such a global route discovery. Instead, the routing decision is based on local topology
information, particularly 1-hop or 2-hop neighbor information. Without global information,
some truthful methods used in topology-based routing can not be applied directly to
geographic routing.
1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we address the selfish nodes problem. We explore various mechanisms
to solve this problem and have developed two detection-based solutions, two low-overhead
truthful routing protocols, one multiple path truthful routing mechanism, and one
1In this dissertation, we use packet and message interchangeably, meaning formatted blocks of data
transmitted over the network.
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truthful greedy forwarding algorithm for position-based routing. Specifically, the following
contributions are made:
• A fair distributed solution [30] to force node cooperation is presented. It judges,
punishes, and readmits selfish nodes. Unlike previous solutions, the focus is on
fairness, i.e., to provide the same chance for all nodes to gain services from the network
and to offer services to the network. Also considered is location privilege which has not
been emphasized in any of the previous solutions. Simulation results show that the
proposed scheme improves data forwarding capability substantially in the presence of
selfish nodes.
• Also presented here is a light-weight solution considering battery status [31]. The
solution is light-weight in that neighbor monitoring is on-demand, and nodes work in
promiscuous mode only part-time to save power. In addition, the solution is fair, in
that battery status is considered. Compared with the first solution, this solution can
more accurately judge selfish nodes as well as deliver more packets.
• A Low Overhead Truthful routing protocol (LOTTO) [32] reduces the overhead from
O(n3) [33] to O(n2).
– An algorithm is developed that collects topology information using a much lower
overhead (from O(n3) to O(n2)) compared to that of ad hoc-VCG [33]. Thus
LOTTO provides much higher network performance than ad hoc-VCG while
achieving truthfulness and least-cost routing.
– Due to the reduced overhead of the protocol, the net cost for truthful routing is
substantially reduced.
• A Light-weight Scalable Truthful routing Protocol (LSTOP) [34, 35] is also presented,
which further reduces overhead to O(n) on average, and O(n2) in the worst case.
– A scalable method is shown to find near-optimal routes (in simulation) with a
low overhead of O(n) on average.
– Due to the low overhead, the protocol is scalable and provides high network
performance. Simulation results show that LSTOP generates far lower (30 to 60
times less) overhead, incurs far lower (2 magnitude of order) end-to-end delay,
delivers significantly more packets, and has an even better overpayment ratio.
Moreover, the net cost for truthful routing is significantly reduced.
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– An easy and accurate way to calculate payment is shown for nodes involved in
route discoveries.
• GTMR [36], a generic mechanism to transform any table-driven multipath routing
protocol into a truthful one, is presented, and shown for guarantee of truthfulness.
In addition, there is TMRP - a truthful multipath routing protocol based on an
AOMDV protocol as an instance of GTMR. A prominent feature of TMRP is that
it incurs only 2n control packets for a route discovery and doesn’t require new types
of control messages over AOMDV. To the best of our knowledge, this is the lowest
overhead incurred for any truthful routing protocol. TMRP can also achieve load
balancing without compromising truthfulness.
• TGF [37], a truthful geographic forwarding algorithm for position-based routing is
also discussed. Three auction schemes are introduced for forwarding packets to the
next node. We show the truthfulness and effectiveness of TGF. To the best of our
knowledge, TGF is the first truthful geographic forwarding algorithm for ad-hoc
networks.
• Extensive simulation studies have also been conducted to evaluate the network
performance of all solutions and protocols. Specifically, LOTTO and LSTOP are
compared with the ad hoc-VCG. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
conduct an extensive simulation study to evaluate important network metrics, such as
packet delivery ratio, overhead, and end-to-end delay for protocols, using mechanism
design for selfish nodes problems. Simulation results show that the protocols greatly
outperform the ad hoc-VCG in all metrics.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The reminder of the dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 reviews existing studies
in this field. Chapter 3 presents two distributed detection-based solutions: a distributed
solution which provides fairness and mitigates location privilege, and a light-weight solution
which takes battery status into account. Chapter 4 presents two truthful routing protocols
LOTTO and LSTOP, which incur O(n2) and O(n) overhead on average, respectively.
Chapter 5 presents a generic mechanism to turn any table-driven multiple routing protocol
into a truthful one, and gives an instance of such a mechanism. Chapter 6 focuses on
position-based routing and presents a truthful greedy-forwarding algorithm. Chapter 7
concludes the dissertation and discuss possible future studies.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
The problem of nodes cooperation in MANETs has received a lot of research interest
recently. Numerous solutions [33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 30]
have appeared in the literature, and each solution has a niche of applicability. This chapter
gives a brief overview of these works.
Based on different philosophies of treating selfishness, solutions can be broadly classified
as detection-based approaches and motivation-based approach. Detection-based approaches
assume that nodes have the responsibility to forward packets for others, i.e., selfishness is
not allowed. Nodes are monitored for their performance and necessary actions are taken
once selfish behavior is detected. Motivation-based approaches, on the other hand, assume
that nodes are selfish in nature and try to motivate them to cooperate by using some form
of incentive such as virtual money (given to nodes upon serving the network). In such
protocols, packet forwarding services are not free. Nodes having incentives/credit can use
it to gain services from the network. When there are no accumulated incentives/credit, the
nodes cannot take any services from the network. However, they can earn credit by serving
other nodes.
2.1 Detection-based Approach
Marti et al. [50] were the first to introduce the selfish-node problem, as a type of misbehaving
nodes. While not focusing on this problem alone, they provided a generic solution for
handling misbehaving nodes. They introduced two tools, watchdog and pathrater, into DSR
extensions to mitigate routing misbehavior (including selfish nodes) in ad hoc networks.
Watchdog is based on neighbor monitoring and is used to identify malicious and selfish
nodes. Pathrater evaluates the overall reputation of nodes on a path. It is used to select
routes which bypass misbehaving nodes, including malicious nodes and selfish nodes. In
their solution, selfish nodes are not penalized. Instead, they can still use the network while
not forwarding packets.
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Buchegger et al. [48, 49] proposed the CONFIDANT protocol to monitor the behavior
of nodes, evaluate the reputation of corresponding nodes, and punish selfish nodes.
CONFIDANT consists of four parts: a monitor, a reputation system, a trust manager
and a path manager. The Monitor records the behavior of neighboring nodes. The
reputation system evaluates the reputation of nodes based on direct observation and
friends’ observation. The trust manager collects indirect warning messages from friends,
and the path manager is used to manage routing with selfish nodes. In CONFIDANT,
each node monitors its next-hop neighbor’s behavior. Detected misbehavior is reported to
the reputation system. If the misbehavior is significant and intolerable, the information
is relayed to the path manager, which will delete the related node from its path. Also, a
warning message will be sent from the trust manager to friends. Upon receiving the warning
message, the trust manager of a receiver evaluates the trustworthiness of the message and
passes it on to its reputation system if necessary. CONFIDANT suffers from an inconsistent
evaluation problem, i.e., different nodes may have different evaluations for the same node
and therefore, some may regard a node as selfish whereas others do not. It also suffers
from a location privilege problem since it punishes nodes if they do not forward packets
regardless of how they contributed to the network before. To avoid punishment, nodes
situated in the center of network have to keep forwarding packets and thus have to spend
much more battery power than those on the periphery of the network.
Michiardi et al. [46] suggested using reputation to measure a node’s contribution to a
network. Reputation is actually a combination of three kinds of reputations: subjective,
indirect and functional. Subjective reputation is calculated based on a node’s direct
observation. Indirect reputation is calculated based on the information provided by others.
Functional reputation refers to subjective and indirect reputation with respect to different
functions. Only routing function and packet forwarding function are under consideration.
All three reputations will be aggregated into a collaborative reputation. Michiardi et al.
proposed the CORE [47] protocol to evaluate nodes according to the above collaborative
reputation. In CORE, each node maintains a set of Reputation Tables (RT) and a watchdog
mechanism (WD). WD is used to verify whether a required function is correctly executed
by the requested node by comparing the observed execution of function with the expected
result. RT is used to maintain the reputation value of other nodes. Reputation is created and
updated along time, based on direct observation by the node itself, or indirect information
provided by others. With reputation, a node can judge the selfishness of a service requester
and thus decide to refuse the request or provide the service.
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Miranda et al. [51] proposed that a node periodically broadcast messages stating its view
of its neighboring nodes. Also, nodes are allowed to publicly declare their refusal to forward
messages to certain nodes. This mechanism causes heavy communication overhead. Paul
and Westhoff [52] introduced security extensions to the DSR protocol to detect attacks
to the routing process. The scheme relies on neighbors monitoring the routing message’s
context in order to find the attacker.
2.2 Motivation-based Approach
2.2.1 Traditional Methods
Traditionally, all nodes participating in data forwarding in traffic get the same payment.
The cost discrepancy (for packet forwarding) between nodes is not taken into consideration.
The use of virtual money (termed a nuglet or credit) to simulate nodes’ cooperation has
been suggested [42, 53]. A node earns money by providing a forwarding service to others,
and has to pay to get service from other nodes. Two payment models, the Packet Purse
Model and Packet Trade Model, have been proposed. In the Packet Purse Model, the sender
attaches nuglets to each packet. Each intermediate node gets some nuglets from the packet
upon forwarding it. In the Packet Trade Model, each intermediate node buys a packet
from its previous node and sells it to its next node. The destination node finally pays the
cost. Security modules independent of nodes are used to protect the nuglets or credit value
from modification and other attacks. Such security modules include some tamper-resistant
hardware which stores certificates of its public key and others from some/all manufacturers.
Fratkin et al. [45] proposed a software solution to avoid the tamper resistant module
in their APE (Ad hoc Participation Economy) system. A trusted third party, termed the
banker node, is used to assure payment consolidation and integrity.
Ben Salem et al. [44] proposed a charging and rewarding scheme in multi-hop cellular
networks. With the help of trustable base stations, the scheme combines symmetric
cryptography with nuglets so that it can prevent some attacks such as refusal to pay and
dishonest rewards. Crowcroft et al.[54] also proposed a pricing model where nodes update
their cost based on bandwidth and power usage.
2.2.2 Game Theory Methods
From the point of view of game theory [55, 56, 57], the node-cooperation problem in wireless
ad hoc networks falls into the framework of the typical non-cooperative game. Here, game
players are all selfish nodes. They are rational in that they make decisions or adopt strategies
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which can maximize their own benefit. Several protocols [33, 58, 59, 60, 41, 39, 38, 40, 61]
have addressed the selfish-node problem from a game theory perspective.
2.2.2.1 General Methods
Zhong et al. [58] proposed Sprite to motivate nodes to report their actions honestly. A
central server, the Credit Clearance Service is placed in each network. The introduction
of CCS relieves the necessity of tamper-proof hardware. In Sprite, every node reports a
receipt, the digest of received or forwarded packets, to CCS whenever it has a connection to
CCS. CCS then determines the charge and credit to each node involved in the forwarding of
the packets. In the basic strategy to motivate nodes to forward packets, CCS asks the sender
to pay the last node on the path receiving a packet α and all predecessors β. However, an
intermediate node may report a (false) receipt even though it does not receive a packet. To
prevent cheating, if the destination does not report a receipt, payment for every node will
be reduced by multiplying a factor of γ to the values in the basic scheme, where γ ≤ 1.
Srinivasan et al. [59] proposed a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm, named
Generous TIT-FOR-TAT, based on which nodes decide whether to accept a relay request or
not. Specifically, a node i maintains a record of its past experience, including the acceptance
ratio of its own relay request for type j sessions and the acceptance ratio by node i for type
j sessions of other nodes. If node i has relayed more traffic sessions than it should, or for
type j session, it has already relayed more traffic than its own to be relayed by other nodes,
it rejects the relay request. Otherwise, node i accepts the request. It has been showed that
this algorithm leads to a Nash equilibrium. Game theory has also been used to evaluate
the CORE algorithm [60].
2.2.3 Mechanism Design Methods
Since nodes incur different costs to forward packets, it is desirable that they get reimbursed
accordingly so that enough incentive is provided and the total payment charged is the least
possible. This poses the requirement that nodes declare their cost honestly, or turthfully.
Basically, this problem is related to research in mechanism design [62].
Anderegg and Eidenbenz [33] were the first to introduce mechanism design into ad hoc
networks. They proposed the ad hoc-VCG for ad hoc networks with selfish agents. This
routing protocol using the VCG mechanism is truthful and cost-efficient. In ad hoc-VCG, a
route request message is flooded over the network and includes information (power and cost)
of all links it has traversed. Upon receiving such a message and finding that this message
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includes any new unknown link, a node appends its own cost and power information and
broadcasts it. Thus, when a destination receives all the broadcast request messages, it
can construct the whole topology and find a least cost path. The VCG mechanism is
applied to the payment calculation for data messages, and it prevents nodes from cheating
over their cost. However, this protocol has some shortcomings and leaves several questions
unanswered. First, it needs O(n3) control messages for a route discovery. It is prohibitive
for the source to pay this cost for its traffic. Second, with an O(n3) overhead, this protocol
cannot provide good performance on metrics such as packet delivery ratio and end-to-end
delay. Third, mobility is not taken into consideration. Fourth, the calculation of payment
for the route discovery is complicated. All of these problems make this protocol difficult to
use in practice.
Zhong et al. [41] proposed CORSAC, a truthful routing protocol which combines the
VCG mechanism and cryptography. For each available power level, a node sends a signed
test signal message. A route message is also signed. This type of cryptography is used to
prevent possible under-declaration of a receiver. Based on these signed messages, which
are flooded over the network by a route discovery similar to that of the ad hoc-VCG, the
destination can determine the topology of the network and apply the VCG mechanism.
However, this protocol has same shortcomings as the ad hoc-VCG protocol. The message
overhead of this protocol is O(ρ · E · n), where ρ is the number of power levels, E the
number of links and n is the number of nodes. More details of CORSAC are discussed in
Chapter 4.3.3.
Chen and Nahrstedt [39] proposed iPass, an auction system where nodes get forwarding
service by bidding in the intermediate nodes. A node sets an auction mechanism in itself
and gives its power and bandwidth to the winner of the bid at the cost of the highest loser’s
price. To set the auction, iPass requires that any intermediate node needs at least two flows
to pass through it concurrently. In addition, it pays intermediate nodes the same amount
of payment, not taking into consideration their cost diversity. Also it does not specify how
to select the next hop and thus find a path from the source to the destination.
Cai and Pooch [38] proposed another method, TEAM , in an attempt to provide a
truthful and low-cost method. A node that can overhear a sender and a receiver becomes
a redirector of data forwarding, i.e., the sender sends data to the redirector and then the
redirector forwards the data to the receiver. The payment to the redirector is the power
saving of this redirection. However, the payment received by intermediate nodes may not
cover their cost, and thus nodes may have no incentive to forward packets. On the other
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hand, the sender saves nothing and gets worse service due to the greater number of hops
used.
Wang and Li [40] also discussed truthful routing based on the VCG mechanism, with
the assumption that a node has a fixed cost of sending a packet to any of its outgoing
neighbors. In particular, they proposed a time optimal algorithm to calculate payment to
nodes in both centralized and distributed manners. The scheme is not suitable in cases
where the forwarding cost to different neighbors varies.
Eidenbenz et al. [61] proposed another VCG mechanism-based protocol, COMMIT,
which allows a source to set a reserve price for its data transmission to a destination. By
utilizing underlying topology control protocols, COMMIT incurs an overhead of O(n2 log n).
Different from the model of the ad hoc-VCG and CORSAC, COMMIT assumes that a node
incurs the same cost to send packets to different neighbors. On the other hand, selfish nodes
may behave selfishly in routing, and they may do so in the topology control. Therefore,
how to achieve topology control with selfish nodes itself is challenging.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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Chapter 3
Detecting Selfish Nodes Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Punishment is usually an effective way to enforce obligation and cooperation. It has been
shown to be even more effective in fostering cooperation than award-giving in animal
societies [63]. However, such a method faces many challenges in ad hoc networks. Without
trusted authorities, each node has to share the responsibility for detecting selfish behavior.
Besides, the characteristics of wireless communication make accurate neighbor monitoring
impossible. Different nodes have distinct observations for a given node due to their different
sensing conditions/positions. Moreover, nodal mobility makes it difficult to trace node
behavior. A good solution should be distributed, catch selfish nodes accurately, and
introduce low overhead. It should also provide fairness such that nodes have the same
chance to serve others and to be served by others.
We introduce two distributed detection-based solutions to solve the selfish nodes
problem. Nodes in the network monitor, judge, punish and re-admit selfish node
distributively. Both solutions use a polling mechanism to ensure fairness and cope with
false accusations, and take into account the scarcity of resources such as battery life. They
provide each node a fair chance to serve and be served.
The reminder of the chapter is arranged as follows: section 3.2 presents a fair distributed
solution [30]. Section 3.3 presents a light-weight solution considering battery status [31].
Section 3.4 summarizes this chapter.
3.2 A Fair Distributed Solution
3.2.1 Overview
To evaluate the selfishness of nodes, we need a criterion to quantify the selfishness of a
node. We define the information used to evaluate selfishness as credit, and use the packet
forwarding ratio as criterion. The packet forwarding ratio is the ratio of the packets
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forwarded to the total packets meant to be forwarded. Packet forwarding ratio reflects
a node’s contribution to the network. Each node must satisfy a preset minimum value for
the packet forwarding ratio. The minimum forward ratio is based on the battery status
of a node. A node may send (its own packet) far more packets than the number it has
forwarded, as long as this node always satisfies the required forwarding ratio. This is not
possible in motivation based schemes, where a node can only send as many packets as it
forwards. The rationale is that every node provides a different contribution to the network.
Because of location privilege, some nodes can contribute more and others less. However, to
be fair, as long as they contribute, they should not be regarded as selfish nodes, and the
network should provide service to them.
A node’s contribution is evaluated by its neighbors based on their direct observations.
These observations are compared with the node’s self-evaluation, to justify behavior. In
our scheme, nodes broadcast their own credit information, and their neighbors verify the
credibility based on what they observe. To achieve this, every node calculates its credit and
broadcasts it periodically to its 2-hop neighbors. Neighbors monitor the node’s behavior and
compare the declared value of credit with what they observe. If the deviation between the
broadcast self-evaluation and the observed value exceeds a certain threshold, the monitoring
node sends out a warning message about the monitored node. If more than k nodes accuse
the same node, the accused node is considered as a selfish node by all nodes in the network.
The selfish node is punished by other nodes by dropping packets intended for, or originated
from, such a node. Routes to be established bypass the selfish node. After a predetermined
amount of time, a selfish node is re-admitted to the network. Thus, a selfish node knows
that selfishness will be harmful, and will be forced to be cooperative.
3.2.2 Evaluating Selfish Behavior
Each node maintains records to monitor and evaluate the selfishness of 1-hop and 2-hop
neighbor nodes. A record has the following fields: NodeID, Pktdrop, Pktfwd, Perfwd,
Batt stat, Creditacc, Seq num. NodeID denotes the identity of the monitored node. Pktdrop
and Pktfwd are the number of packets that the monitored node dropped and forwarded,
respectively as observed by a monitoring (in the promiscuous mode) node. Perfwd is defined
as
Pktfwd
(Pktdrop+Pktfwd)
∗ 100%. Batt stat represents the battery status of the monitored node.
There are four levels, Normal, Low1, Low2 and Recharged. Normal indicates the node has
enough battery. Low1 indicates that the node does not have enough battery and thus, will
not participate in new route discoveries or flooding (if any). Low2 indicates that the node
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has very low battery and implies that it will not participate in packet forwarding. Recharged
indicates the node has been recharged and has enough battery. Different battery statuses
corresponds to different criteria of selfishness (See below for further discussion). Creditacc is
used to record accumulated net forwarded packets, i.e., Creditacc=
∑
Pktfwd -
∑
Pktdrop
in each battery life cycle (a cycle is the period during which the battery status changes
from Normal to Recharged). Seq num is the latest version of the credit message known to
the monitoring node. A node also keeps its own credit information.
Initially, each node sets up an entry for each of its neighbors. For every entry, the initial
value of all fields is set to zero, except Perfwd, which is set to 100% (that is, initially all
nodes are considered unselfish). Every node maintains its own credit by adding Pktdrop
and Pktfwd, respectively, taking retransmissions into consideration. Periodically, it sends
out a Credit message to its neighbors consisting of NodeID, Pktdrop, Pktfwd, Batt stat,
and Seq num. Each node increases Seq num by one for every credit update message it
broadcasts. The credit message is updated upon the expiration of the credit update timer
or when the Batt stat is changed due to energy dissipation.
3.2.3 Monitoring Selfishness
Nodes monitor neighbors’ activity by listening (in the promiscuous mode) to all packets
within the radio range. If a neighbor forwards a packet, then it increases Pktfwd for that
neighbor, taking the retransmissions into consideration. Similarly, if the neighbor drops a
packet, it increases the corresponding Pktdrop. When a node receives its neighbor’s Credit
message, it compares Pktdrop and Pktfwd data in the message with what it has monitored.
If the data differs from the observed value beyond a threshold, then the monitoring node
suspects that the neighboring node is lying. In practice, there are some cases where it is hard
to judge whether a packet has been forwarded or not [50]. Therefore, the data declared and
the data monitored may not be equal. However, if the originator of the credit message is
honest, then the deviation between these data will not be large. If a node finds the deviation
is under threshold τ , it adapts the declared value and overwrites its own observed value,
and continues monitoring based on this new value. Otherwise, if the deviation exceeds τ ,
the node sends out a warning message to accuse the monitored node with the following
fields, AccusedID, AccuserID, Seq num, andMac. AccusedID and AccuserID denote the
monitored node and the originator of this message, respectively. Seq num is the same as in
the latest Credit message. MAC (Message Authentication Code) is a signed digest over all
previous fields with a private key. It is used to provide integrity and non-repudiation.
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The conviction is based on voting, i.e., if more than k neighbors accuse the same node,
the accused is convicted of being selfish. A selfish node may accuse a normal node of
being selfish. A larger k can prevent more false accusations and avoid unnecessarily false
punishment of a good node. However, a larger k requires more time to converge. On the
other hand, as the nodes on the periphery of the network have fewer neighbors, a smaller
value works well in their situation. Generally, a node in an ad hoc network may have 8-10
direct neighbors [14]. So k can be set as 5 or 6, or at least 60% of the node’s neighbors.
3.2.4 Confirming Selfishness
To confirm that a node is selfish, nodes use Ratiofwd (packet forwarding ratio) and Batt stat.
We use three different thresholds, th1, th2 and th3 for Ratiofwd, corresponding to battery
status. When a node is in normal status, its Ratiofwd should be above th1. Otherwise, the
monitored node is convicted of selfishness. Similarly, th2 and th3 correspond to Low1 and
Low2 battery status. It is also important to note that th1 > th2 > th3. Also, th1 should
be much higher than th3 (th3 is at least 50%) because if the node has enough battery, it
should forward packets.
A node may pretend to have lower battery status to forward few packets and save its
energy. To prevent this, we introduce two strategies. The first strategy is to restrict the
benefits a lying node can get. If a node declares its status in Low1, then it is free from
participating in routing. However, it cannot initiate a new route discovery for itself, and
it has to participate in packet forwarding. A node in Low2 status is free from forwarding
packets. However, it is allowed to send out its own packets, as many as Pktfwd - Pktdrop,
i.e., its net contribution is recorded as credit. After a node is in Low2 status, it is given
a grace period of ∆T seconds to get recharged. During ∆T , the node may not send or
forward packets. After getting recharged, it issues a new Credit message to update its
neighbors. Upon receiving this announcement, the neighbors set Creditacc to Creditacc +
Pktfwd - Pktdrop and resets Pktfwd and Pktdrop for the originator to zero and Ratiofwd to
100%. The data used for Ratiofwd is based on the new Pktfwd and Pktdrop values. This
is because as the node has recharged and has enough battery, and therefore should behave
normally and be evaluated normally. On the other hand, its previous contribution should
not be ignored. So, Creditacc is used to record its previous contribution and the node can
use it when in Low2 status.
Another strategy is to have every node estimate the battery consumption of its
neighbors. A node’s battery consumption consists of four parts: power used for routine task,
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power used for working in the promiscuous mode, power used for forwarding and sending
packets, and power used for receiving packets, denoted by eR, ep, es, er, respectively. Thus,
total power consumption P = eR + ep + es + er . ER and ep are time dependent
quantities and are assumed to be same for all the nodes. Depending on how long a node
has been working during a battery cycle, nodes can estimate eR and ep. Es and er are
proportional to the number of packets sent or received. Supposing that forwarding a packet
requires e units of power and every node consumes the same energy for packet forwarding,
es can be estimated as e ⋆ Pktfwd(the difference in packet length is ignored); similarly we
can estimate er. Since every node can estimate its neighbor’s battery consumption, it can
verify the credibility of Batt stat in the Credit message broadcast by the neighbor. Using
the above criteria, every node can independently decide if a node is selfish.
3.2.5 Punishment and Re-admission
Once a selfish node has been identified, it is punished. The neighbors of a convicted node
refuse to forward any packets originating from this selfish node. Thus, a selfish node will
be excluded from the network. However, the selfish node is excluded only temporally (for
some predetermined temp bypass time). The exclusion is not a perfect solution; instead
the goal is to force the nodes to cooperate and thus benefit each other. After punishment,
a selfish node is likely to be more cooperative. As a selfish node is not a malicious node,
it’s fair to give it a chance to provide service and use the network. However, some nodes
may continue to behave selfishly even after being initially punished. In such a case, the
temp bypass time can be increased exponentially as 2i ⋆temp bypass where i represents the
number of times the node has behaved selfishly. Thus, nodes continuing to behave selfishly
are punished severely.
3.2.6 Combining with Routing Protocols
This protocol can be easily combined with routing protocols such as DSR [13] and
AODV [19]. In AODV, whenever a source node needs a route to a destination node, it
broadcasts the route request RREQ. Any intermediate node which knows a fresh route
to the destination may reply to this request, otherwise it propagates the request. Upon
receiving the request, a destination replies with an RREP towards the source along the
reverse route. During routing maintenance, upon detecting an inaccessible downstream
node, a node sends RERR along the active route(s) toward the source(s). Combined with
our scheme, a node needs to check the selfish node list whenever it gets routing packets. It
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can drop any packet sent from a selfish node. Thus during route discovery, any known selfish
node will be excluded. During routing maintenance, upon convicting its downstream node
as a selfish node, a node sends an RERR to the source. The source may initiate a new route
request to find a good route. The combination is even simpler for DSR. An intermediate
node can exclude selfish nodes as in the case of AODV. The source itself can check the node
list in the RREP and drop routes containing any known selfish node. Similarly, during
data forwarding, when a source receives a message declaring a newly found selfish node, it
deletes all routes containing that selfish node.
3.2.7 Performance Evaluation
3.2.7.1 Simulation Setup
We conducted simulations to evaluate the impact of our scheme on a network with selfish
nodes. Specifically, our simulation focused on the following metrics:
• Packet delivery ratio is defined as
P
Packetsreceived
P
Packetssent
, i.e., the ratio of the total number
of packets received by the intended receivers to total packets originated by all nodes.
To be realistic, we considered the packet delivery ratio as the comprehensive result of
all factors which could affect the packet delivery rate, from the application layer to
the physical layer, such as collisions in the MAC layer, rerouting in the network layer,
and so on.
• Overhead is defined as ∑ni=1 Packetscontroli , i.e., the overall protocol control packets
exchanged by nodes in the network. It includes Hello messages and routing packets
such as RREQ, RREP and RERR. In our study, three additional types of packets (or
messages) are introduced: Credit messages, Accuse messages and Black messages. A
Credit message is periodically broadcast by a sender to provide credit information. An
Accuse message is sent whenever a node suspects that its direct neighbor is behaving
selfishly based on its observations. Finally, a Black message is flooded all over the
network whenever a node has been convicted as a selfish node.
• A false conviction is the number of nodes that convicted as selfish that are actually
cooperative.
• A missed conviction is defined as Nodes
undetected
selfish
Nodesselfish
∗ 100%, i.e., the percentage of nodes
that not detected as selfish nodes that behave selfishly.
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We use AODV as the underlying routing protocol and have two implementations for
it. The original AODV, named base, is used for comparison with our enhancement, termed
enhance.
We modeled selfish behavior in two ways. In the first model, a selfish node starts
behaving selfishly from the beginning. We denote this version as enhance start and
base start, corresponding to enhance and base version, respectively. In the second model,
the selfish node begins to behave selfishly at a random time during the simulation. Thus a
node may drop packets at the beginning of simulation while another node may drop packets
400 seconds into simulation time. Nodes tend to be selfish after they dissipate more energy,
thus we believe this model to be more realistic than the first model. We denote the version
corresponding to this model as enhance random and base random.
Also, we implemented two versions to detect selfish behavior. One is directed at data
packet forwarding only. The other aims to detect selfish routing behavior.
We used Glomosim, a scalable network simulator [64], for simulation. Unless specified
otherwise, the following parameters were used in our simulations. 50 nodes were placed
uniformly in an area of 1000m by 1000m, with a radio range of 250m. 802.11 protocol with
DCF was used as the MAC protocol. All nodes followed the Random Waypoint mobility
model [65] with a speed up to 10 m/s and a pause time of 30 seconds. Each simulation
lasted for 900 seconds of simulated time. 10 CBR flows were simulated, each sending 4 512-
byte data packets per second. Each flow started at 120 seconds and ended at 880 seconds.
The first 120 second period of the simulation was used to provide sufficient randomization
to nodal positions. The last 20 seconds of the simulation were used to prevent the data
transmissions from sudden stopping because of the end of the simulation. Data points
represented in graphs were averaged over 10 simulation runs, each with a different seed.
3.2.7.2 Simulation Results
3.2.7.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 3.1(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to percentage of selfish nodes. Both enhance versions have a higher packet
delivery ratio than the corresponding base version: enhance start yields as much as a
90% improvement over base start and enhance random shows up to a 36% improvement
over base random. The packet delivery ratio decreases as the percentage of selfish nodes
increases because more nodes drop packets. An important feature is that enhance start
performs better than enhance-random while base start performs better than base-random.
This is because both base and enhance systems suffer from selfish nodes dropping packets.
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Figure 3.1: Performance under different selfish node percentages
However, in the base case, no action is taken to bypass these selfish nodes. In base start,
all selfish nodes behave selfishly from the beginning and thus they drop all packets passing
through them. In base random, selfish nodes only behave selfishly from a random moment.
They may behave cooperatively for some time and forward packets. Some selfish nodes
even behave well for most of the simulation time. Thus more packets are forwarded in the
base random case. However, under an enhanced scheme, selfish behavior will be detected
and those selfish nodes will be bypassed. The earlier the behavior is detected, the fewer
the dropped packets and thus the higher the packet delivery ratio. If selfish nodes behave
selfishly from the beginning, they are much easier to detect. However, if they behave well
initially for a period of time and selfishly thereafter, the deviation of credit between the
observed and the self-declared may not exceed the threshold or the deviation may not be
sharp enough and thus they are hard to be detected. As shown in Fig. 3.1(d), there are more
undetected selfish nodes in enhance random than in enhance start. Finally, in the presence
of 30% selfish nodes, the packet delivery ratio is still as high as 37% in base start. This is
because a portion of traffic occurs between direct neighbors. In addition, some traffic has
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short paths, with only one or two intermediate nodes behaving well.
3.2.7.2.2 Overhead Fig. 3.1(b) shows the overall protocol control overhead introduced
by our enhancement over different evaluating intervals with respect to the percentage of
selfish nodes. It is normalized as packets per node per second. Enhance random 10 and
enhance random 20 correspond to enhance random with an evaluating interval of 10 and
20 seconds, respectively. This is the same for enhance start 10 and enhance start 20. The
overhead is mainly due to the Hello messages, which are broadcast every two seconds
by every node, and RREQ messages. The periodic Credit messages also contribute some
overhead. As the evaluating interval increases, the Credit messages decrease and thus the
overhead decreases. As the percentage of selfish nodes increases, the overhead increases
slowly. This is because more selfish nodes will be detected and thus more new RREQs will
be initiated. This also explains why overhead caused by enhance start is higher than that
caused by enhance random although they produce the same number of credit messages. In
enhance start, selfish behavior is easier to detect and thus produces more RREQ packets.
3.2.7.2.3 False Conviction Fig. 3.1(c) shows the number of false convictions with
respect to percentage of selfish nodes. In any case, no more than 0.5 nodes, averaging over
10 runs, are falsely convicted. So the rate of false conviction is very low. A node will file
an accusation as long as the deviation between the observed and the declared exceeds the
threshold. Due to radio interference, a node cannot always monitor its neighbors accurately
and thus convicting a node based on a single accusation is not feasible. A voting system is
used to avoid false convictions. However, false convictions still happen in special cases. For
example, if the majority of the observed node’s neighbors are between the observed node and
some other traffic, due to interference from these traffic, neighboring nodes may misjudge
the node as a selfish node and accuse it. The accused node will be wrongly convicted. We
can raise the threshold in the voting system to lower false convictions. However, this will
raise the missed convictions and thus lower the performance (i.e., packet delivery ratio).
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between false convictions and missed convictions. A false
conviction is not sensitive to the evaluating interval since it occurs in some special cases.
3.2.7.2.4 Missed Conviction Fig.3.1(d) shows the missed conviction ratio with
respect to the percentage of selfish nodes. Enhance random has a high missed conviction
ratio, averaging about 50% while enhance start has a much lower ratio, averaging less than
14% (about 9.7% for the evaluating interval of 10s). As discussed earlier, detection of selfish
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behavior is difficult in the former case and easy in the latter one. We also observed that the
evaluating interval affected the missed conviction ratio. A larger evaluating interval reduces
the missed conviction ratio in enhance random while increasing the ratio in enhance start.
This can be explained as follows. In enhance random, a selfish node may behave well in the
beginning and selfishly later, so we need a credit deviation between the observed and the
declared sharp enough to detect this behavior. A larger interval helps this deviation. In
enhance start, such a requirement is not necessary and a smaller interval is more aggressive
in detecting the misbehavior. Of course, too small an interval will blur the credit deviation
and thus raise the missed conviction ratio.
3.2.7.2.5 Impact of Mobility Fig. 3.2(a) and (b) show packet delivery ratio with
respect to maximum node speed, corresponding to selfish behavior from a random moment
and from the beginning, respectively. Four speeds were used in the mobility model - 5m/s,
10m/s,15m/s and 20m/s, keeping a maximum pause time of 30 seconds. In both scenarios,
as speed increases, the packet delivery ratio drops. There are two reasons for this. One
reason is that higher mobility causes more link breakages. Another reason is that missed
convictions increase with higher mobility because it is harder to trace a highly mobile selfish
node. Again, the start cases performed better than the random cases.
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Figure 3.2: Packet delivery ratio vs. selfish node percentage, with changing speed
3.2.7.3 Impact of Routing Packets
Fig. 3.3 shows false conviction based on the detection of selfish routing behavior, where
a node does not participate in routing, with an evaluating interval of 20 seconds. As in
the data forwarding case, we name the cases where nodes behave selfishly from the be-
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Figure 3.3: False conviction for detecting routing behavior
ginning and from random moment for routing as routing pkt random and routing pkt start,
correspondingly. Compared to the result based on data packets, termed data pkt random
and data pkt start, false conviction in routing pkt random and routing pkt start is much
higher. In fact, the credit deviation threshold set for routing is less strict than that for data
forwarding. If using same threshold, the false conviction will be even higher and cannot
be used for detecting misbehavior at all. This is ascribed to the broadcast property of the
routing message. Unlike a unicast message, broadcast does not use RTS/CTS. A broadcast
packet is sent out as long as the channel is free and will not be retransmitted even if
collision occurs. Routing message (RREQ) is flooded over the network and causes collision
and interference here and there. So the credit counting for a routing packet forwarded is
much less accurate than that in data forwarding and thus results in a high rate of false
convictions. This simulation reveals the very important fact that a purely detection-based
method is not suitable for detecting routing selfish behavior.
3.3 A Light-weight Solution Considering Battery Status
In the previous section, we presented a fair distributed solution for the selfish-node problem,
focusing on location privilege problems. Selfish nodes should be detected. However, a good
solution for selfish nodes should also be light-weight. If the cost for identifying selfish nodes
in terms of battery and bandwidth is very high, it may be enough to just identify suspicious
nodes. A selfish node is not a malicious node as it just wants to save its resource, not to
destroy or attack others.
In this section, we present a new solution for the selfish-node problem, considering all
the above issues. The solution is based on neighbor monitoring. However, this monitoring
is on demand. We consider battery status such that nodes work in promiscuous mode only
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when necessary. They can ask for exemption from data forwarding based on their battery
status.
3.3.1 Overview
To enable neighbor monitoring, nodes work in the promiscuous mode. However, working
in the promiscuous mode has a high cost. Feeney [66] showed that receiving traffic in the
promiscuous mode is much more expensive than discarding traffic and even more expensive
than working in idle mode. Thus, to save energy, nodes should work in the promiscuous
mode as little as possible.
Generally, the majority of traffic will pass through the center of the network. So, nodes
in the center will forward more packets (and thus consume more energy) than those in the
periphery. This results in a location privilege problem. To mitigate this problem and to
provide fairness to all nodes, we evaluate a node’s behavior based on its battery status. A
node can declare low battery status to exempt itself from forwarding packets. Measures
can be taken to prevent a node from cheating on battery status. Also, a cooperative node
should be able to get service from others.
Initially, all nodes need not work in the promiscuous mode. After sending a data packet,
a transmitter S turns onto promiscuous mode to monitor the downstream node A’s behavior.
Upon detecting the dropping of a certain number of consecutive packets, the transmitter S
sends a broadcast message to ask for the help of A’s neighbors. These neighbor nodes turn on
the promiscuous mode to monitor A’s behavior for some time and turn off promiscuous mode
thereafter. Node A defends itself by declaring the number of packets it has forwarded. Based
on their own observation, neighbors make their judgment about node A. If the majority
of neighbors accuse A, A is convicted as a selfish node. A selfish node will be punished
by other nodes by dropping packets intended for and originated from such a selfish node.
Routes will be re-established to bypass the selfish node. After a predetermined amount of
time, a selfish node can be re-admitted to the network. Thus, a selfish node knows that the
selfish behavior will be harmful and it will be forced to be more cooperative.
3.3.2 Monitoring Selfish Behavior
After a node S sends (or forwards) a packet to its downstream node A, it turns onto
the promiscuous mode to observe if A forwards the packet. No other node monitors A’s
forwarding behavior at this time. If S does not overhear that A forwarded that packet
within a specific period, S suspects that A dropped that packet. If S finds A has not
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forwarded packet for a consecutive number of times (e.g., 20 packets), S has good reason to
believe that A is selfish. However, it is possible that S did not overhear packet forwarding
due to collisions or interference. So S asks the help of other nodes by broadcasting an
Alert message to other adjacent nodes. An Alert message includes the following fields,
Target,Requestor, Period, Seq num, where Target is the ID of the node that needs to be
monitored, Requestor is the ID of the node originating this request (in this example, it is
S), Period indicates how long the observation should last. Period can be decided based
on the rate of the traffic forwarded by the requester. The requester can ask to monitor
a predefined number of packets. Thus, the Period is inversely proportional to the packet
sending rate of a traffic, i.e., the higher the traffic rate, the shorter the period. Node A can
also get an Alert.
Upon receiving the Alert message, every neighbor of A establishes a record for node
A. They turn onto promiscuous mode and overhear the forwarding packets at node A and
increase the packets dropped, sending counts accordingly. This observation lasts for the
observation period in the Alert message. On the other hand, node A also gets the Alert
message. By the end of this observation period, node A has to broadcast a self-declared
Defence message to state how many packets it forwarded during the observation period,
including < NodeID,Pktfwd, Pktdrop, Seq num >, where NodeID is the originator of this
message, Pktfwd and Pktdrop indicates the number of packets forwarded and dropped during
the observation period, Seq num is used to prevent replay of an old Defence.
3.3.3 Conviction of a Selfish Node
Upon receiving a Defence message, A’s neighbors will compare their observation with this
self-declared value. If the deviation exceeds a threshold τ , an Accuse message against
A is sent out. An Accuse message includes the following fields: AccusedID, AccuserID,
Seq num, Mac. AccusedID and AccuserID denote the monitored node and the originator
of this message, respectively. Seq num is the same as in the last Defence message. MAC
(Message Authentication Code) is a signed digest over all the previous fields with the private
key of the sender of the Accuse message. It is used to provide integrity and non-repudiation.
It is possible that A does not broadcast Defence or its neighbor does not receive this
message. Then the node that does not receive the Defence message will send an Accuse
against A. After sending their opinions, A’s neighbors can turn off their promiscuous mode
for the purpose of monitoring A unless requested to do so by other nodes.
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The conviction is based on voting, i.e., if more than the majority of neighbors or over a
predefined number of neighbors accuse a node A, A will be convicted as a selfish node.
A Simplification: The above algorithm can prevent some attacks from malicious
nodes. If we assume no malicious nodes, we can further simplify the algorithm. Some
nodes may have an accurate observation for the observed node. Upon hearing an Accuse
message, if a node finds that its observed value is almost the same as the self-declared
value in the Defence message, it can send an Innocence message to suppress further
Accuse messages. The originator of Alert can verify if the Defence coincides with what
the originator forwarded. This should reduce the overhead caused by Accuse messages.
Moreover, it may reduce false convictions.
Punishment As discussed in Section 3.2, a convicted selfish node is temporarily
excluded from the network for a predetermined temp bypass time and then will be re-
admitted. If it still behaves selfishly thereafter, the temp bypass time is increased
exponentially as 2i ⋆ temp bypass where i represents the number of times the node has
behaved selfishly.
Enhancing Routing Protocols As discussed in Section 3.2, this scheme can be
combined with routing protocols such as DSR [13] and AODV [19]. During route discovery,
nodes drop route request sent (forwarded) from the known selfish nodes. During data packet
forwarding, if a node A convicts its downstream node B as a selfish node, A sends RERR
to the source. The source may initiate a new route request to find a good route. In DSR,
the source can also check the node list in the Route Reply and drop a route containing any
known selfish node. Also, upon receiving a notification that declares a new convicted selfish
node in DSR, the source can delete routes including that selfish node.
3.3.4 Battery Caring
A node may lose battery over time and thus become unsuitable for forwarding packets.
Such a node can declare that it has low battery and is free from forwarding packets. The
traffic going through this node should change routes to bypass this node. The node in low
battery status will not be regarded as a selfish node and can still get service from others.
Under this scheme, nodes in the center of the network, usually consuming more battery
power, can have a rest and get no punishment, and therefore the location privilege problem
is mitigated.
When a node C has low battery, it broadcasts a Battery message to announce its
low battery status, including NodeID,Batt stat, Seq num, where NodeId is the ID of the
28
originator, Batt stat indicates battery status of that node (defined as Normal or Low),
Seq num indicates the freshness of the message. After receiving C’s Battery message, its
upstream node on the route should inform the source to change its route.
A node in low battery status is given a grace period ∆T seconds to get recharged. After
recharging, the node issues a new Battery message to inform its neighbors. Thereafter it is
expected to forward packets normally.
A node may pretend to be in low battery status and thus it may forward few packets.
As discussed in Section 3.2.4, two possible strategies can be used to prevent such cheating.
The first strategy is to restrict the benefits a lying node can get. A node in low battery
status is free from forwarding packets. However, it is allowed to send out only Pktallowed
number of its own packets. If a node is cooperative, it will contribute to the network. This
contribution should be reimbursed. However, due to the limited remaining battery power,
even though a node may have a great net contribution, it can only send a limited number
Pktallowed of its own packets while in low battery status. Nodes with less net contribution
may thus get additional benefits. However, this benefit is limited due to the above packet
limitation Pktallowed.
Another strategy is to have every node estimate the battery consumption of its
neighbors. A node’s battery consumption consists of four parts: power used for routine
tasks, power used for working in the promiscuous mode, power used for forwarding
and sending packets, and power used for receiving packets, denoted by eR, ep, es, er,
respectively. ER is time dependent quantity, decided by how long a node has worked during
a battery cycle, and is assumed to be same for all the nodes. Ep consists of two parts, one
to monitor its downstream node’s behavior, which is proportional to the number of packets
sent, and the other to monitor a neighbor’s behavior under the request of some neighbor(s).
This can be assumed to be same for all the nodes. Es and er are proportional to the number
of packets sent or received. Assuming that forwarding a packet requires the same unit of
energy for all nodes, es and er can be estimated based on the number of packets sent or
received. Based on this estimation of battery consumption, a node can verify the credibility
of the Battery message broadcast by the neighbor.
3.3.5 Performance Evaluation
3.3.5.1 Simulation Setup
We conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate the impact of our scheme on a
network with selfish nodes. In additional to the metrics (packet delivery ratio, overhead,
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false conviction and missed conviction) measured in Section 3.2, we evaluated another
metric, that is, Averaged promiscuous time. This indicates how much time, on the average,
a node works in the promiscuous mode. As Glomosim does not provide enough information
for energy consumption in the promiscuous mode, we use this metric to evaluate the effect
of power saving.
We compared the proposed protocol with work carried out in Section 3.2. The curves
for the algorithm in Section 3.2 are denoted as credit. The curves for the system without
any enhancement, which is used as the baseline for comparison, are denoted as base. The
curves for the light-weight algorithm are denoted as light.
As in Section 3.2.7.2, we modeled selfish behavior in two ways. First, a selfish node starts
behaving selfishly from the beginning. We denoted this version as light start, credit start
and base start, corresponding to light, credit and base versions, respectively. In the second
model, a selfish node begins to behave selfishly at a random time during the simulation.
We denoted the version corresponding to it as light random, credit random and base random
corresponding to light, credit and base versions, respectively.
We used Glomosim for simulation. 50 nodes were placed uniformly in an area of 1000m
by 1000m. The radio range of nodes was 250m. We used AODV as the underlying routing
protocol and 802.11 protocol with DCF as the MAC protocol. All nodes followed the
Random Waypoint mobility model with a speed range of 0 m/s to 10 m/s and a pause time
of 30 seconds. Each simulation lasted for 900 seconds. 10 CBR flows were simulated. Each
flow sent four 512-byte data packets per second, started at 120 seconds and ended at 880
seconds. Data points represented in the graph were averaged over 10 simulation runs, each
with different seed.
3.3.5.2 Simulation Results
3.3.5.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 3.4(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to the percentage of selfish nodes, with a maximum speed of 10m/s. As the
percentage of selfish nodes increases, the packet delivery ratio decreases as more nodes
drop packets. In the figure, when 35% nodes are selfish, light start improves the delivery
ratio by 130% over base start, and light random improves the delivery ratio by 74% over
base random. Compared with the fair solution in Section 3.2, light start improves the
delivery ratio by 18% over credit start ; light random improves the delivery ratio by 25%
over credit random. Also we can see that light start performs the same as light-random
whereas credit start performs better than credit random and base random performs better
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Figure 3.4: New performance under different selfish node percentages.
than base start. The performance of base and credit have been discussed in Section 3.2.7.2.
In the base case, no action was taken to bypass these selfish nodes. In the credit system,
selfish nodes behaving selfishly from a random moment are more difficult to find than those
behaving selfishly from the beginning. Under the light scheme, once a node is suspected
to behave selfishly, it will be traced and only its behavior during the traced period will be
considered. Thus, a node can be caught regardless of when it behaves selfishly. Compared
with credit, light can catch more selfish nodes, as shown in Fig. 3.4(d), and thus has a higher
packet delivery ratio.
3.3.5.2.2 Overhead Fig. 3.4(b) shows the overall overhead introduced by our enhance-
ment with respect to percentage of selfish nodes, with a maximum speed of 10m/s.. It is
normalized as packets per node per second. The overhead is mainly due to RREQ messages.
In light scheme, total control packets not including RREQ is only 6% - 17% of the overall
overhead, and the total overhead in light start is almost the same as in light random. As the
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percentage of selfish nodes increases, the overhead increases. This is because more selfish
nodes will be detected and thus more new RREQ will be initiated. Compared with the
credit scheme, light start has a lower overhead than credit start whereas light random has a
higher overhead than credit random. Nevertheless, the overhead is still low, with less than
0.75 packet per node per second.
3.3.5.2.3 False Conviction Fig. 3.4(c) shows false convictions with respect to the
percentage of selfish nodes, with a maximum speed of 10m/s. light random causes no false
convictions. Under the light start, false conviction was only 0.1 node (less than 0.8%) and
happens only in 25% and 30% selfish nodes case. Compared with credit, light catches the
selfish node more accurately. We use a voting system to avoid false convictions. Only two
false convictions occurred in some extreme cases. In these cases, the majority of an observed
node’s neighbors are between the observed node and other traffics. These observing nodes
suffer from interference from these traffics and hence have inaccurate observations for the
observed node. Thus, such nodes accuse the observed node.
3.3.5.2.4 Missed Conviction Fig. 3.4(d) shows the missed conviction ratio with
respect to the percentage of selfish nodes, with a maximum speed of 10m/s. Both
light random and light start catch almost all the selfish nodes, with maximum missed
conviction ratio of 4.5%. In most cases of light start, the missed conviction ratio is under
1%. It catches more selfish nodes than light random because nodes behaving selfishly from
the very beginning give the system more time and chance to detect them. On the contrary,
missed conviction in credit is pretty high, particularly for credit random, for the same reason
discussed in the packet delivery ratio section.
3.3.5.2.5 Impact of Mobility Fig. 3.5(a) and (b) show the packet delivery ratio with
respect to maximum speed, corresponding to selfish behavior from a random moment and
from the beginning, respectively. We used four speeds in the mobility model as 5m/s,
10m/s, 15m/s and 20m/s, keeping the maximum pause time at 30 seconds. In both figures,
an increase in speed has little effect on packet delivery ratio, mainly due to higher mobility
causing more link breakages. It shows our scheme is insensitive to mobility.
3.3.5.2.6 Time in the Promiscuous Mode Fig. 3.6 shows the time a node spends
in the promiscuous mode. light start and light random spend almost the same time, which
is less than 35% of the total data traffic time. Unexpectedly, as the percentage of selfish
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Figure 3.5: New packet delivery ratio vs. selfish node percentage, with changing speed
node increases, the time spent in the promiscuous mode decreases. On the one hand, as
selfish nodes increase, more Alert messages will be sent and more nodes will turn on the
promiscuous mode. Thus more nodes may increase their promiscuous time. On the other
hand, more selfish nodes will drop more packets. If a packet is dropped, the successors in
the path do not need to turn on the promiscuous mode to monitor their downstream nodes
and thus, decrease the time in the promiscuous mode. In some cases, the source cannot
find a path within a period. During that period, no node needs to work in the promiscuous
mode for that traffic. The decrease factor outweighs the increase factor, so the overall time
for the promiscuous mode decreases with increase in the number of selfish nodes.
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3.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we have presented two distributed detection-based solutions for the selfish-
node problem. In both solutions, we used a voting system to confirm a node’s selfishness
to avoid the necessity for a centralized service. It can also solve the inconsistent evaluation
problem. We emphasized fairness to provide same chance for each node to serve and
be served by others. The first solution uses credit as a metric for evaluating a node’s
contribution to the network. Such a metric is different from the virtual money and
reputation used previously. It can greatly mitigate the location privilege problem not
addressed in other proposals. Our second solution is a light-weight solution, requiring
neighbor monitoring only when necessary. It can identify almost all selfish nodes with
very few mistakes and reduces the time spent in the promiscuous mode to save battery.
Simulation results show our solutions are effective. They raise the packet delivery rate
efficiently, cause few false accusations and have low overhead.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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Chapter 4
Improving the Efficiency of Truthful Routing
4.1 Introduction
An effective way to motivate nodes’ cooperation is to pay them for forwarding packets.
Obviously, selfish nodes want to get paid as much as possible, while the nodes utilizing packet
forwarding want to pay as little as possible. To achieve an equilibrium, it is desirable to
reimburse nodes according to their cost. However, nodes incurs different cost for forwarding
a packet since they may use different level of power and have different costs per unit of power.
On the other hand, to maximize their utility, selfish nodes may not expose their true cost.
Thus, truthful protocols (strategies) are needed to prevent cheating.
Controlling message overhead in the context of truthful routing is critical. First, the cost
of overhead in terms of control messages incurred by such truthful protocols must also be
reimbursed. A rational sender may have no reason to send packets at a very high cost, and
thus truthful routing may lose its significance. Second, high overhead often results in low
network performance. Usually, the less the overhead, the better the network performance.
Anderegg and Eidenbenz [33] recently proposed a truthful routing protocol, named ad hoc-
VCG, for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish nodes. The complexity of the routing overhead
of their protocol is O(n3), where n is the number of nodes in the network. Such an overhead
may be prohibitively large as the network size grows.
We introduced two low overhead truthful routing protocols. The first protocol,
LOTTO [32] - a low overhead truthful routing protocol can find the least cost path for data
transmissions with an overhead of O(n2), a significant improvement over ad hoc-VCG. The
second protocol, LSTOP [34, 35] – a light-weight scalable truthful routing protocol incurs
an even lower overhead of O(n) on average, and O(n2) in the worst case.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides background on
mechanism design and system models. Section 4.3 presents details of the LOTTO protocol,
including protocol description and truthfulness analysis, and a simulation study. Section
4.4 presents details of LSTOP and simulation study. Section 4.5 summarizes this chapter.
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4.2 System Model and Preliminaries
4.2.1 The VCG Mechanism
Mechanism design [67], a subfield of game theory, studies how to design a system so that
its behavior results in the desired system goal, under the assumption that agents are selfish
and rational. It is traditionally used in market settings and now is being introduced into
networking for resource and task allocations.
One of the important results in mechanism design is the VCG mechanism [62],
named after Vickrey [68], Clarke [69] and Grove [70]. The most salient feature of the
VCG mechanism is that it can maximize the total welfare of the system and achieve
truthfulness [62]. Nisan and Renon [62] illustrated the application of the VCG mechanism
in networking as follows. They describe a network as a biconnected graph. Each edge e of
the graph is an agent and has a cost Ti of sending a single message along this edge. The
mechanism design goal is to find a shortest path sp between two given nodes s and d. Then
the following mechanism is truthful: e gets no payment if it is not on the shortest path.
Otherwise, it gets the payment Pe = T
−e
sp − T e=0sp [62]. Where C−esp is the cost (length) of
the shortest path not containing e, and T e=0sp is the cost of the shortest path assuming zero
cost of e. Feigenbaum et al. [71] showed that this claim holds true with nodes as agents.
4.2.2 The System Model
We consider a mobile ad hoc network as a directed weighted graph G = (V,E,W ). V is the
set of nodes, or agents in the mechanism design. E is the set of links between nodes. W
is the set of weights for each link, indicating the cost to forward a packet along that link.
Each link may have a different weight. A node (agent) has a different cost to forward a
packet to different neighbors. The network is biconnected, i.e., the graph is still connected
on removing any node and its incident links.
A node vj within radio range of node vi is represented as the link (vi, vj). Power
consumption is used as the cost metric. The weight wij of the link (vi, vj) is decided as
the product of vi’s emitting power P
emit
i and its cost of unit power ci, i.e., wij = P
emit
i · ci.
Control messages are sent with maximum emitting power to reach more nodes. However, for
data transmissions, and to save power, the sender sends a packet using the least power with
which the receiver can receive the packet. Technically, a sender i can choose its emitting
power P emiti and this power determines the radio range. From the wireless propagation
model, the signal strength received by the receiver j is P reci,j =
K·P emiti
dα , where K is a constant
and α ∈ [1,6] is the distance-power gradient depending on the environment condition (α is 2
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for free space and 4 for a two-way ground reflection model). If P reci,j exceeds a threshold P
rec
min,
then j can receive the data correctly. With the assumption of omnidirectional antenna, data
will be overheard by all the nodes within the radio range of the sender. Therefore, if the
transmitting power P emiti is known, a receiver j can estimate the minimum emitting power
needed for the sender i to forward data to it (node j) as Pmini,j =
P emiti ·P
rec
min
P reci,j
.
Virtual money is used to stimulate cooperation between nodes. A node can earn money
by forwarding packets for others. A source is charged for the forwarding service. The
payment is on a per packet basis. It should cover the cost for data transmissions and
control messages, and includes some bonuses. The cost for data transmissions is the sum
of links cost along the least cost paths from sources to destinations. It is important to note
that the cost for route discoveries is high and cannot be ignored due to the large number
of control messages and the high emitting power used. Nodes are assumed to be selfish and
rational. They pursue maximization of their utility and thus may falsely declare their cost.
However, they do not intend to destroy the network or attack other nodes.
In this chapter, we focus on effective truthful routing under the assumption of no
collusion between nodes. Other issues such as the bootstrap of the virtual money, and
securely crediting and transferring money are out of the scope of this chapter. We assume
a payment mechanism [58] that takes care of accounting and transferring of payment
between nodes. Tamper-proof hardware [42] can also be used to protect virtual money
from modification or other attacks.
4.3 LOTTO - A Low Overhead Truthful Routing Protocol
LOTTO is a low-overhead truthful routing protocol which can find a truthful least cost path
for data transmissions by applying the VCG mechanism. To date, the VCG mechanism is
the only truthful mechanism for the least cost path problem [71]. LOTTO is a reactive
routing protocol and is invoked when a new route is needed. It consists of two parts. The
first part is route discovery and is discussed in Section 4.3.1. It intends to determine the
topology of the network, which is essential for applying the VCG mechanism. Our route
discovery greatly reduces the message overhead complexity from O(n3) [33] to O(n2). The
second part consists of payment calculation and is discussed in Section 4.3.2. By using the
VCG mechanism, the payments to nodes are set such that rational nodes have no incentive
to cheat over their cost. Thus truthfulness is guaranteed. Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 presents
the truthfulness analysis and message complexity analysis, respectively.
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4.3.1 Route Discovery
The VCG mechanism can guarantee that a rational node tells the truth about its cost.
However, to apply the VCG mechanism, the source needs to find not only the least cost
path LCP as < s,M1,M2, · · · ,M i, d > to the destination, but also the least cost paths to
the destination excluding node M1, the least cost paths to the destination excluding node
M2, · · · , the least cost paths to the destination excluding node M i, respectively. Thus
route discovery should provide the underlying directed weighted graph of the network to
the source. LOTTO provides a method to collect this topological information effectively.
It reduces the message overhead complexity from O(n3) [33] to O(n2).
Whenever a source s wants to communicate with a destination d, it sends a RREQ
message. The RREQ message is of the form < s, d, seqNo, cs, P
emit
s >, where s and d are
the node IDs of the source and destination, respectively. SeqNo is the sequence number of
this request. Cs is the sender’s cost per unit of power and P
emit
s is the emitting power of
the sender.
Upon receiving a RREQ message from node i, a node j takes the following actions:
1. Determine the power P reci,j at which j received the packet.
2. Estimate the minimum power from node i to node j as Pmini,j =
P emiti ·P
rec
min
P reci,j
.
3. Append node i, ci and P
min
i,j to its neighbor list. A neighbor list is a list of structures
consisting of node ID, the minimum emitting power from the neighbors of node j to
node j, and cost per unit of power of these neighbors.
4. Check the freshness of the RREQ message from its sequence number. If it’s a new
message, node j appends its ID j, its cost per unit of power cj and its emitting power
P emitj to the RREQ message and rebroadcasts it.
1
5. Set a report timer (RT ) for reporting a neighbor list after receiving the first RREQ
message for the session.
When RT times out, nodes in the network send their neighbor lists to the source using a
Neighbor message. A Neighbor message is of the form < s, d, seqNo, i, (j, cj , P
min
j,i ), · · · , (k,
ck, P
min
k,i ) >, where s and d are the IDs of the source and destination; seqNo is the sequence
number obtained from the RREQ; i is the ID of this message sender; j, · · · , k are the IDs
1An alternative is that the RREQ message makes no use of source routing, i.e., rather than appending
its information in the RREQ message, node j replaces node i’s information to the RREQ message with its
own information (ID j, its cost per unit of power cj and its emitting power P
emit
j ).
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of i’s neighboring nodes; cj, · · · , ck are the cost per unit of power of neighbors j, · · · , k,
respectively; and Pminj,i , · · · , Pmink,i are the minimum power needed from neighbor j, · · · , k to
node i, respectively.
The Neighbor message can be sent through source routing, which is established as the
reverse route to the source when a node receives a RREQ message. However, a node which
is not on the least cost path may selectively drop Neighbor messages so that the source node
gets incomplete topology information, thus increasing the probability that this node will
lie on the selected least cost path. To prevent such an occurrence, each Neighbor message
is flooded over the network. Thus, with the assumption that the network is biconnected,
a selective Neighobr message dropped by a node will not thwart the Neighbor messages
from reaching the source through other routes. Nodes within the radio range of the source
can unicast their Neighbor messages directly to the source instead of flooding.
We assume that forwarding nodes will not modify Neighbor messages since such
modification action is a malicious behavior rather than a selfish behavior. However, if nodes
exhibit malicious behavior, cryptography can be applied to detect such modifications. The
neighbor list information in the Neighbor messages can be encrypted using a symmetric key
shared only between the sender and the source node. A symmetric key can be established
a priori or with the help of a public cryptography system.
Upon receiving all the Neighbor messages, the source knows all nodes’ incident links
and thus can construct the underlying directed weighted graph of the network. The source
finds the least cost path using a Dijkstra or Bellmen-Ford algorithm [72] and calculates the
payment to intermediate nodes, as discussed below in Section 4.4.3.2.
Data Forwarding: After finding the least cost path, the source can send data packets
along this path. The header of data packets includes the node list < s, v1, v2, · · · , vk, d >,
the minimum power Pmini , i ∈ 1, k needed for every intermediate node vi to forward data
to its downstream node, and payment Pi to every intermediate node vi. The payment
to each intermediate node can also be accounted and reimbursed accordingly by a central
server [58].
Route Rediscovery: Link breakage occurs during data transmission due to node mobility
or the shutting down of a node. Also a node’s cost to forward packets may increase over
time and thus the assigned payment is not feasible for that node. In such cases, the
corresponding node sends a route error (RERR) message to the source. Upon receiving the
RERR message, the source initiates a new route discovery to find an alternate path to the
destination.
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4.3.2 Payment Calculation
All nodes are rewarded for their packets forwarding. To pay nodes accordingly, we need to
know their cost. As stated in Section 4.2.1, the VCG mechanism can guarantee that nodes
show their true cost. The following passage describes how the payment is calculated.
4.3.2.1 Payment for Route Discovery
To encourage nodes’ participation in a route discovery, a source reimburses all nodes involved
in the route discovery. A unit amount is paid to each node to forward a routing message.
This unit payment can cover the maximum cost of a node for a routing message. Credits
to each node can be counted in a way similar to ad hoc-VCG [33].
4.3.2.2 Payment for Data Forwarding
Data is forwarded along the least cost path. The payment to the nodes on the least cost
path is calculated according to the VCG mechanism [62]. Nodes not on the least cost path
get no payment for data transmissions. Specifically, we can suppose that the least cost path
is < s, v1, v2, · · · , vk, d >, denoted as LCP , and the cost of LCP is Clcp. We denote the
declared cost of a node vi, i ∈ {1, · · · , k} as Ti. We denote the least cost path from s to d
excluding node vi as LCP
−vi and the cost of this path as C−vilcp . Then, Pvi , the payment to
a node vi, i ∈ {1, · · · , k} [62, 71], is calculated as
Pvi = C
−vi
lcp − Clcp + Ti (4.1)
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Figure 4.1: A weighted graph
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a weighted graph. In this graph the least cost path from
s to d is LCP =< s, v3, v4, d >, and Clcp = 2 + 3 + 2 = 7. The least cost path without v3
is LCP−v3 =< s, v1, v2, d >, and its cost is C
−v3
lcp = 5 + 4 + 2 = 11, then the payment to v3
is Pv3 = C
−v3
lcp − Clcp + Tv3 = 11 − 7 + 3 = 7. Similarly, the least cost path without v4 is
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LCP−v4 =< s, v3, v2, d >, and its cost is C
−v4
lcp = 2 + 4 + 2 = 8. Thus the payment to v4
is Pv4 = C
−v4
lcp − Clcp + Tv4 = 8 − 7 + 2 = 3. Note that the total payment to the nodes on
the least cost path is greater than the cost of that path since the intermediate nodes are
awarded more than their own cost. These marginal utilities are what those nodes pursue.
An alternative is to distribute the overpayment evenly among all intermediate nodes
along a path [33]. In this case, every node is reimbursed equal to its cost. Bonus (payment
subtracted by cost) of all intermediate nodes on a path will be summed up and then be
distributed evenly among the nodes.
4.3.3 Truthfulness Analysis
As described in Section 4.3.1, a link lij ’s weight is determined by the sender vi and the
receiver vj. We now show that telling the truth about the cost (emitting power, cost per
unit of power and minimum estimated power) is the dominant strategy for every rational
node [33].
First we show that the sender vi has no incentive to cheat over cost.
Case of Under-declaration A sender vi may under-declare its cost Ti by under-
declaring its emitting power P emiti or its cost per unit of power ci in an attempt to get extra
utility (margin). There are two possibilities. In the first case, node vi is not on the least
cost path initially. After under-declaration of its cost, if vi is still not on the least cost path,
then it gets no payment for data forwarding. On the other hand, vi may be selected to be
on the least cost path. We denote the actual least cost path before vi’s under-declaration of
its cost as LCPt and its cost as C
t
lcp. We denote the least cost path after under-declaration
as LCP and its cost as Clcp. It is important to note that LCPt will be the least cost path
after excluding vi (on LCP ) from the network, i.e., C
−vi
lcp = C
t
lcp. We denote the actual
cost of vi as T
t
i (its declared cost is Ti). Then
∑
j∈LCP∧j 6=i Tj + T
t
i > C
t
lcp = C
−vi
lcp and thus
C−vilcp −
∑
j∈LCP∧j 6=i Tj < T
t
i . From Equation 4.1, we have
Pvi = C
−vi
lcp − Clcp + Ti = C
−vi
lcp −
∑
j∈LCP
Tj + Ti
= C−vilcp −
∑
j∈LCP∧j 6=i
Tj .
(4.2)
Thus Pvi < T
t
i , i.e., it implies that vi’s payment cannot cover its cost and thus vi gets
negative utility. In the second case, vi is already on the least cost path initially. In this
case items in Equation 4.2 do not change even if vi under-declares its cost. Thus vi gets the
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same payment as when it tells the truth. Therefore, we conclude that vi has no incentive
to under-declare its cost.
Case of Over-declaration Alternatively, vi may over-declare its cost by over-declaring
its emitting power P emiti or cost per unit of power ci with the hope of getting a higher
reimbursement. The over-declaration of cost makes the path through vi more expensive.
On one hand, this may cause the least cost path not go through vi and thus vi losses the
chance to get the utility. On the other hand, if vi is still on the least cost path, then items
in Equation 4.2 do not change due to vi’s over-declaration and thus vi’s payment will be
still the same as the payment when it tells the truth. Therefore, vi has no incentive to
over-declare its cost. In summary, vi has no incentive to cheat over its emitting power or
cost per unit of power.
Similarly, a receiver vj’s best strategy is to declare the true estimated minimum emitting
power Pmini,j . If vj under-declares P
min
i,j , it may let the least cost path pass through it.
However, the sender vi will use a lower power to send packets and thus vj will be out of
the radio range of vi. vj can forward nothing and gets no payment. If vj over-declares
Pmini,j and thus making the path through vj more expensive, the least cost path may not go
through link lij . Even if link lij is still on the least cost path (after the over-declaration),
vj ’s over-declaration of cost increases the cost of the path Clcp. From Equation 4.1, since
C
−vj
lcp and Tj do not change while Clcp is increased, vj will get less payment than it gets
when it tells truth about Pmini,j . Thus vj has no incentive to tell lies about its estimated
minimum emitting power Pmini,j .
Zhong et al. [73] discuss vj ’s strategy in case of vi’s over-declaring P
emit
i . If vi over-
declares P emiti by α times and vj declares cost truthfully, then the estimated minimum
power to cover link lij will be αP
min
i,j . Thus lij may not be on the least cost path. If
vj under-declares the cost by β times (1 < β ≤ α), the estimated minimum power will
be αPmini,j /β < αP
min
i,j , and thus lij has more chance to be on the least cost path. Since
αPmini,j /β > P
min
i,j , vi can still reach vj. Thus vj can get a better payoff than it could get
by declaring the true minimum power. However, vi will not use this estimated minimum
power αPmini,j /β to send packets to vj . Instead, it will factor out its over-declared ratio α
and use Pmini,j /β < P
min
i,j to send the packet. Without this, vi’s over-declaration does not
have a point. Thus vi can not reach vj . Vj gets no payoff, even if lij is still on the least cost
path after the over-declaration of P emiti . Thus vj ’s best strategy is still to declare the true
estimated minimum power Pmini,j .
Base on their argument, Zhong et al. provided a protocol to prevent a node from under-
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declaring Pmini,j by combining the VCG mechanism with cryptography. Their protocol results
in the O(ρ ·E · n) message overhead, where ρ is the number of power levels, E the number
of links and n the number of nodes. LOTTO’s route discovery can be used in their protocol
and it reduces their message overhead from O(ρ · E · n) to O(n2).
4.3.4 Message Complexity Analysis
In LOTTO, a route discovery consists of two stages. In the first stage, the RREQ message
from the source is flooded over the network. Each node forwards the RREQ message once,
resulting in a total of n messages, where n is the number of nodes. In the second stage,
each node issues a Neighbor message. If a node is within the radio range of the source, it
can directly send its Neighbor message to the source. Otherwise, it floods the Neighbor
message over the network to prevent being selectively dropped by certain nodes. Thus, in
the worst case, a node’s Neighbor message will be forwarded once by each node, resulting
in an O(n) message overhead. In the second stage, n nodes’ Neighbor messages result
in O(n2) message overhead. To sum up these two stages, a single route discovery incurs
n + O(n2) = O(n2) message overhead.
In ad hoc-VCG, a route discovery also consists of two stages. In the first stage, the
RREQ message is flooded over the network. However, unlike LOTTO, where a node
forwards only one RREQ for a route discovery, in ad hoc-VCG, a node forwards multiple
RREQ messages for a route discovery. A RREQ message is initiated by the source and
includes information ( weight) about all links it has traversed. Upon receiving a RREQ
message from its neighbor node B, a node A checks if this RREQ message contains any
link that it (A) has not known about. If so, node A forwards (broadcasts) this RREQ
message by appending its identification, emitting power and cost of unit power. A node A
may even forward (broadcasts) multiple RREQ messages from the same neighbor B as long
as they contain new links unknown to node A. In a network, the possible number of links is
O(n2), where n is the number of nodes. Thus, each node in ad hoc-VCG (except the source
and the destination) may need to forward (broadcast) O(n2) RREQ messages containing
at least one new link weight, resulting in a total O(n3) message overhead for n nodes. In
the second stage, the destination sends an RREP message to the source after it collects
topology information and calculates a least cost path. This RREP message will traverse
at most n hops, resulting in at most n message overhead. To sum up, a route discovery in
ad hoc-VCG incurs an O(n3) message overhead.
43
4.3.5 Performance Evaluation
We conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of our protocol
on a network with selfish nodes. We compared the proposed protocol with the ad hoc-VCG
protocol [33], since both the protocols give incentives to nodes to forward packets under
the assumption that nodes are selfish and rational, and both achieve the design objective of
truthfulness of the selected routes. We did not compare our protocol with generic routing
protocols such as DSR and AODV, because our protocol works under a different model of
node behavior. The generic routing protocols are feasible in networks where all nodes are
obedient (i.e. they follow the protocol), and are willing to cooperate. Our protocol, on
the other hand, is aimed at networks where nodes are selfish and need some incentives to
forward packets.
In our simulation study, we consider the following performance metrics:
• Packet delivery ratio, as defined in Section 3.2.7.1. The packet delivery ratio is a
comprehensive result of all factors which could affect the packet delivery ratio, such as
collisions in the MAC layer, rerouting in the network layer, and so on.
• Overhead is the sum total of the protocol control messages exchanged by nodes in the
network, including routing messages as RREQ, RREP, Neighbor and RERR.
• Delay is defined as
Pn
i=1 packet
i
delay
n , i.e., the average end-to-end delay of data packets
from senders to receivers.
• Overpayment ratio is defined as
Pn
i=1 Pay
i + Costs
Pn
i=1 Cost
i , i.e., the ratio of total payment to
the intermediate nodes paid by all the source nodes plus the cost of the sources to total
cost incurred by all nodes for data transmission.
• Energy consumption. This is the total energy (power) consumed to send all packets,
including route discoveries and data transmissions.
In the following discussion, vcg stands for the ad hoc-VCG protocol [33] and lotto stands
for the proposed protocol LOTTO.
We used Glomosim [64] for simulations. Unless specified otherwise, the following
parameters were used in simulations. Sixty nodes were placed uniformly in a square area
of 600 meters by 600 meters. Since a wireless card usually has only a few discrete power
level settings instead of a continuum power level, we simulated four levels of power emission
for nodes, i.e., 1, 3, 5, 7 dBm, corresponding to the radio ranges of 125, 158, 198 and 250
meters, respectively. The routing messages were always sent with the highest power level.
For simplicity, we assumed that nodes have the same cost of unit power. We used an 802.11
protocol with DCF as the MAC protocol and modified it to send packets at different power
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levels. Default values are used for MAC layer parameters. All nodes followed the Random
Waypoint mobility model [65] with a speed range of 0 m/s to 10 m/s and a pause time of
30 seconds. Each simulation lasted for 900 seconds of simulated time. 10 CBR flows were
simulated, starting at 100 seconds and ending at 880 seconds. Each CBR flow sent four
256-byte data packets per second. Data points represented in the graphs were averaged
over 10 simulation runs, each with a different seed. Confidence intervals (95%) are shown
with vertical bars in the graphs.
4.3.5.1 Impact of Mobility
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Figure 4.2: Performance of different speeds for 60 nodes
4.3.5.1.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 4.2(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to maximum speed. We observe that lotto provides a much higher packet delivery
ratio over vcg. This can be ascribed to three reasons, all resulting from vcg ’s O(n3) message
overhead.
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First, a large number of RREQs cause heavy message propagation congestion in the
MAC layer and result in a high delay of message propagation. Results of our simulation
study show that, in a static network, a destination node needs several seconds to collect
information about most of the links, and even more time to collect information about
all links. In a dynamic network, it is impossible to collect all link information as the
topology keeps changing during the RREQ flooding period. In order to guarantee that the
selected path is of least cost and truthful, comprehensive topological information is needed.
After collecting link information, the destination sends an RREP message to the source,
including the least cost path and related information. However, the propagation of this
RREP message is time consuming due to heavy congestion in the MAC layer, and in our
simulations we found that it may take a several seconds to reach the source node. Therefore,
the whole route discovery can take long time. In a dynamic network, after the source node
receives the RREP , the selected route (the least cost path) may be outdated. The higher
the mobility of nodes, the higher the probability that the network topology changes, and the
higher the probability that the selected route is outdated. Thus data transmissions along
the selected route may encounter link breakages, resulting in increased route discoveries,
which generate even more RREQ messages and make the situation worse.
The second reason is that vcg ’s large number of RREQ messages cause severe overflows
of the network output queues and thus a lot of packets are dropped, including RREP
packets. The dropping of RREP messages results in increased route discoveries, which
generates even more RREQ and increase the problem. Table 4.1 shows the packets dropped
due to overflow of output queues. The number of packets dropped due to queue overflow in
vcg is about two magnitudes of order higher than that in lotto.
speed 0 2 4 6 8 10
lotto 0 2810 4786 6682 8078 8474
vcg 467431 1476108 1423999 1408228 1346671 1328511
Table 4.1: The number of packets dropped due to output queue overflow
The third reason is that vcg ’s large number of RREQ messages cause severe radio
interference [74], resulting in data packet being dropped. Nodes outside the radio range
but within the interference range of a communicating node pair may interfere with that
communication and result in packets drops. The interference range is larger than the radio
range, and can be twice that of the radio range. The data packet drops result in increased
route discoveries, which generate even more RREQ messages and worsen the situation.
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Even in a static network, many packets are dropped and multiple route discoveries are
invoked during a single data session.
As mobility increases, packet delivery ratio decreases for both protocols. Higher mobility
causes more link breakages and thus results in more packets dropped. Link breakages result
in increased route discoveries, which generate even more RREQ messages and thus make
the situation worse.
4.3.5.1.2 Overhead Fig. 4.2(b) shows the overhead with respect to maximum speed.
We observe that lotto’s overhead is much lower than that of vcg. As discussed in
Section 4.3.4, vcg results in a total O(n3) overhead for a route discovery while lotto results
in a total overhead of O(n2).
4.3.5.1.3 End-to-end Delay Fig. 4.2(c) shows the end-to-end delay with respect to
maximum speed. We observe that lotto’s end-to-end delay is significantly lower than that of
vcg. This is due to the reasons described in Section 4.3.5.1.1. First, vcg takes a long time to
discover a route. Second, in vcg, route discoveries may fail due to RREP messages dropped
resulting from the output queue overflows. Route discoveries may also fail due to the late
arrival of RREP messages, i.e., when RREP messages reach the source nodes, the waiting
timer for the route discoveries might have already timed out, and the source nodes might
have already invoked the route discoveries again. Thus, source nodes need more time to
find paths to the destination nodes. Third, in vcg, data packets have to wait in the output
queue for a long time before being transmitted over the channel. As mobility increases, the
end-to-end delay increases for both protocols. Higher mobility causes more link breakages
and thus results in even more RERRs, which slows down route discoveries and causes even
longer output queues in the MAC layer.
4.3.5.1.4 Energy Consumption Fig. 4.2(d) shows the energy consumed in sending
packets with respect to maximum speed. We observe that lotto consumes much less energy
than vcg because it sends much less control packets than vcg. As mobility increases, the
energy consumption increases for both the protocols because an increase in mobility results
in more route discoveries, which causes transmission of more control packets and thus
consumes more energy.
As shown above, increased mobility degrades the network performance, mainly due to
the increased routing overhead. Thus in case of higher mobility, a proactive routing protocol
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may incur less overhead, and thus may perform better than a reactive routing protocol. This
would be an interesting subject for future research.
4.3.5.2 Impact of the Network Size
To study the impact of network size, we changed the number of nodes. Two cases were
considered. In the first case, we fixed the node density at 6000 m2/node and changed the
number of nodes from 50 to 90. In the second case, we fixed the network area at 600m*600m
and changed the number of nodes from 50 to 80. We set the maximum speed at 10 m/s in
both the cases.
4.3.5.2.1 The case of Fixed Node Density Fig. 4.3(a) shows the packet delivery
ratio with respect to the number of nodes, while keeping the density fixed. We observe
that the packet delivery ratio of lotto is much higher than that of vcg. This is due to the
reasons discussed in Section 4.3.5.1.1. As the number of nodes increases, the packet delivery
ratio decreases for both protocols. With a fixed node density, an increase in the number of
nodes results in an increase in network area and an increase in the average hop count of a
path. Thus node mobility is more likely to cause link breakages, resulting in more packet
drops and increased RREQ messages, particularly for vcg. These control packets weigh
down the network traffic, cause severe output queue overflow, and increase interference for
data transmission, both resulting in more packets being dropped. Also, the number of links
increases with the number of nodes, and thus route discoveries in vcg need more time to
collect link information. Thus the selected paths are more likely to be outdated, causing
more link breakages, which results in increased route discoveries and a worsening situation.
Fig. 4.3(b) shows the overhead with respect to the number of nodes keeping the density
fixed. We observe that the overhead of lotto is much lower than that of vcg. This is because
vcg generates O(n3) overhead while lotto generates an overhead of O(n2). As the number
of nodes increases, the overhead increases for both the protocols for two reasons. First, an
increase in the number of nodes results in an increase in the number of RREQ messages
(and Neighbor messages for lotto). Second, an increase in the number of nodes results in
more link breakages, as discussed above, and thus results in more route discoveries.
nodes 50 60 70 80 90
lotto (pkts.) 1070 1661 2332 3163 4038
vcg (pkts.) 11884 13328 19185 18932 21697
Table 4.2: Average overhead per route discovery with fixed node density
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Figure 4.3: Performance for different numbers of nodes
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To further analyze the overhead, we normalize the overhead as control packets per route
discovery. Table 4.2 shows the overhead per route discovery with different numbers of
nodes. The overhead of lotto is almost 1 magnitude of order lower than that of vcg.
Fig. 4.3(c) shows the end-to-end delay with respect to the number of nodes keeping
the density fixed. We observe that lotto incurs a much lower delay than vcg. This is due
to the reasons discussed in Section 4.3.5.1.3. As the number of nodes increases, the delay
increases for both the protocols. An increase in the number of nodes results in an increase
in the overhead and thus results in more packets in the output queues which aggravate
queue overflow. Longer output queues increase the waiting time of data packets. Queue
overflow causes the failure of a route discovery. In addition, route discovery is slower as
it needs more time to collect link information. Both result in data packets staying in the
source node’ buffers for a longer period of time.
Fig. 4.3(d) shows the overpayment ratio with respect to the number of nodes keeping
the density fixed. The ratio is no more than 1.13 for lotto. lotto’s overpayment ratio is a
little lower than that of vcg. It implies that lotto can find better paths than vcg. The main
reason is that in vcg, with node mobility, it is difficult to collect complete link information
to get the most effective routes and thus the most effective overpayment ratio. The ratio
changes a little for both the protocols as the number of nodes changes, except at the point
of 90 nodes, where vcg has a lower overpayment ratio than lotto. This is because in vcg a
large portion of data packets delivered to the destinations are sent from the sources to the
destinations directly, meaning that the sources and the destinations are neighbors.
Fig. 4.3(e) shows the energy consumed for sending packets with varying number of nodes
keeping the density fixed. We observe that lotto consumes much less energy than vcg even
though it delivers many more data packets because it generates much fewer control packets.
As the number of nodes increases, more nodes are involved in sending packets, particularly
for route discoveries, and the total energy consumption increases for both protocols.
4.3.5.2.2 The Fixed Area Case Fig. 4.3(f) shows the packet delivery radio with
respect to the number of nodes keeping the network area fixed. We observe that lotto
provides a much higher delivery ratio over vcg. This is due to the reasons discussed in
Section 4.3.5.1.1. As the number of nodes increases, i.e., the node density increases, the
packet delivery ratio decreases for both protocols. For vcg, as the number of nodes increases,
the number of links increases, resulting in longer route discoveries. The probability that
selected paths are outdated increases and thus link breakages increase, causing more packets
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to be dropped. Furthermore, an increase in overhead due to route discoveries results in
severe output queue overflow and radio interference with data transmission, causing more
packet drops. Lotto has less output queue overflow and radio interference than vcg.
nodes 50 60 70 80
lotto (pkts.) 1176 1661 2219 2860
vcg (pkts.) 11317 13328 21287 27239
Table 4.3: Average overhead per route discovery with a fixed area
Fig. 4.3(g) shows the overhead with respect to the number of nodes keeping the area
fixed. We observe that lotto’s overhead is much lower than that of vcg because lotto
generates O(n2) RREQ messages while vcg incurs O(n3) RREQ messages. As the number
of nodes increases, more nodes are involved in the route discoveries, thus increasing the
overhead for both protocols. Table 4.3 shows the overhead per route discovery. Vcg incurs
much higher overhead than lotto. Comparing Table 4.2 with Table 4.3, we can see that,
for lotto the overhead per route discovery in the case of fixed density is almost the same as
that in the case of fixed area. In lotto, every node sends only one RREQ message and one
Neighbor message, which are flooded over the network, for a route discovery. However, for
vcg, the overhead per route discovery in the case of fixed area increases faster than that in
the case of fixed density. This is due to the fact that an increase in the number of links in
a small area is faster than that in a larger area as the number of nodes increases.
Fig. 4.3(h) shows the end-to-end delay with respect to the number of nodes keeping
the area fixed. We observe that lotto incurs a much lower delay than vcg. This is because
of the reasons discussed in Section 4.3.5.1.3. As the number of nodes increases, the delay
increases for both protocols. This is due to the same reason discussed in the case of fixed
node density.
4.3.5.3 Impact of Load
4.3.5.3.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 4.4(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to the number of flows for 60 nodes and a maximum speed of 10 m/s. We observe
that lotto provides a much higher packet delivery ratio than vcg. This is due to the reasons
discussed in Section 4.3.5.1.1. As the load increases, the packet delivery ratio decreases for
both protocols. This is because the output queue overflow, together with packets collisions
and interference, increases when the number of flows increases, causing more packet drops.
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Figure 4.4: Performance for different loads with 60 nodes
4.3.5.3.2 Overhead Fig. 4.4(b) shows the overhead with respect to the number of flows
for 60 nodes and a maximum speed of 10 m/s. We observe that lotto causes significantly
lower overhead than vcg since vcg generates O(n3) RREQ messages for route discoveries
while lotto incurs an only O(n2) overhead. In lotto, an increase in the number of flows causes
an increase in route discoveries, resulting in an increase in the overhead. The overhead of
vcg changes little with respect to the number of flows. This occurs for two reasons. First,
with more flows, each route discovery collects fewer RREQ messages due to collisions and
interference of these RREQ messages. Second, due to bounded simulation time, the long
time of route discovery restricts the number of new route discoveries.
4.4 A Light-weight Scalable Truthful Routing Protocol
4.4.1 Overview
It is desirable to find a truthful and optimal (least-cost) path between a source and a
destination. By far, the VCG mechanism is the only solution[71]. The VCG mechanism
requires multiple optimal routes and thus a complete underlying weighted graph should be
determined. However, the least cost path established by the VCG mechanism is meant for
data forwarding. The cost of network topology discovery is beyond the consideration of the
VCG mechanism, and finding network topology is not trivial. It costs ad hoc-VCG [33]
an O(n3) overhead. Moreover, finding the complete topology of a network is not practical.
A network topology can be acquired by some routing protocols, in practice, which resort
to a broadcast approach. Due to collision and radio interference, a broadcast message is
not reliable. There is no guarantee that nodes within the radio range of a broadcaster
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will receive the broadcast message. Thus some links in the network topology may remain
undetected.
A near-optimal (near least-cost) path for data traffic with very low overhead may
reduce total cost and may be more scalable. This is the stimulus for our LSTOP protocol.
Compared to the ad hoc-VCG, LSTOP provides near-optimal paths for data traffic with
significantly low overhead. It reduces the message overhead to O(n2) in the worst case
and to O(n) on the average. The basic idea of how LSTOP functions can be summarized
as follows: the source sends a route request on demand. Every node forwards the route
request once. Based on route requests, nodes construct neighbor lists. One route is selected
by the destination as the base to construct a subgraph of Gp. Only the nodes around this
selected route report their neighbor lists to the source. Using these neighbor lists, the source
constructs a subgraph Gp and finds the least cost path in Gp using the Dijkstra algorithm.
Then, the VCG mechanism is applied to calculate the payment to nodes so that a rational
node has no incentive to lie about its cost.
4.4.2 Route Discovery
Route discovery intends to construct a subgraph Gp of the whole network. The subgraph
Gp includes the source, destination and some intermediate nodes. To apply the VCG
mechanism, this subgraph should be biconnected.
Whenever a source s wants to communicate with a destination d, it initiates an RREQ
message. This message includes < s, d, seqNo, cs, P
emit
s >, where s and d are the node
IDs of the source and the destination, respectively; seqNo is the sequence number of this
request; cs is the sender’s cost per unit of power and P
emit
s is the emitting power of the
sender.
Upon receiving a RREQ message from a node i, a node j takes the following actions:
1. Determine the power P recj at which j received the message.
2. Estimate the minimum power from node i to node j as Pmini,j =
P emiti ·P
rec
min
P reci,j
.
3. Append node i, ci and P
min
i,j to its neighbor list. A neighbor list is a list of structures
consisting of node ID and the minimum emitting power from the neighbors of node j
to node j and cost per unit of power of these neighbors.
4. Check the freshness of the RREQ message by its sequence number. If it’s a new
message, node j appends its ID j, its cost per unit of power cj and its emitting power
P emitj to the RREQ message and rebroadcasts it.
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After receiving the first RREQ, the destination waits for a specific period τ and then
sends an RREP to the source. We denote the path along which the first RREQ arrived as
SP hop. The RREP is sent along SP hop in the reverse direction and includes the node list
of that path. The waiting period τ is used to let RREQ messages reach as many nodes as
possible so that nodes can get as complete neighbor lists as possible.
After forwarding RREP to the source, nodes on the path SP hop report their neighbor
lists to the source. Nodes work in the promiscuous mode and thus nodes not on the path
SP hop may overhear the RREP message. We denote the set of nodes on the path SP hop as
V onsp and the set of nodes not on path SP
hop but within radio range of SP hop (i.e., within
radio range of any node in V onsp ) as V
near
sp . When nodes in V
near
sp overhear RREP messages,
they send their neighbor lists to the source using Neighbor messages. A Neighbor message
includes such fields as < s, d, seqNo, i, (Neighborj , cj , P
min
j,i ), · · · , (Neighbork , ck, Pmink,i ) >,
where s and d are the IDs of the source and destination, respectively; seqNo is
the sequence number acquired from the RREQ; i is the ID of this message sender;
Neighborj , · · · , Neighbork are the IDs of i’s neighboring nodes; cj , · · · , ck are the cost
per unit of power of neighbor j, · · · , k, respectively; and Pminj,i , · · · , Pmink,i are the minimum
power needed from neighbor j, · · · , k to node i, respectively. These Neighbor messages use
source routing. The routes to the source are established as the reverse routes of the routes
along which nodes received the RREQ messages. Nodes not overhearing RREP messages
don’t send Neighbor messages.
Upon receiving all these neighbor lists from nodes in V nearsp and V
on
sp , the source
constructs a subgraph Gp which includes the source, destination and all nodes within the
radio range of nodes on path SP hop. In a network with sufficient high density, this subgraph
Gp is biconnected. In cases where the acquired subgraph is not biconnected, the source node
invokes a new route discovery. By using the Dijkstra or Bellmen-Ford algorithm [72], the
source can find a least cost path in Gp, denoted as SP p.
Figure 4.5 illustrates this route discovery. s and d denote the source and the destination,
respectively; the thin solid line denotes the SP hop; the thick dash dot line denotes the SP p;
the area enclosed by the dotted line is the found subgraph Gp. Only nodes within this
enclosed area send Neighbor messages to the source node. With high probability, the least
cost path is present in the area enclosed by the dotted line. Thus SP p may be a good
approximation of the least-cost path for the whole network.
Data Forwarding: After finding the least cost path, the source can send data packets
along this path. The header of data packets includes the node list < s, v1, v2, · · · , vk, d >,
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of LSTOP
the minimum power Pmini , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} needed for every intermediate node vi to forward
data to its downstream node, and payment Pi to every intermediate node vi. The payment
to each intermediate node can also be accounted for and reimbursed accordingly by a central
server [58]. Tamper-proof hardware [42] can be used to protect virtual money or payment
from modification and other attacks.
Upon link breakage due to mobility or cost change, the corresponding node sends a route
error (RERR) message to the source. The source then invokes a new route discovery.
Message Complexity: In LSTOP, route discovery consists of two stages. In the first
stage, RREQ floods over the network. Every node forwards one RREQ message. Thus a
total of n RREQ messages are sent. In the second stage, nodes in V onsp and V
near
sp send one
Neighbor message each to the source using source routing. The total number of Neighbor
messages forwarded is
∑
i∈V onsp
hopis +
∑
i∈V nearsp
hopis, where hop
i
s denotes the hop counts
from node vi to the source s. Typically, the diameter of a network is
√
n, i.e., the number
of nodes on a path is
√
n. The number of neighbors of a node, denoted as µ, is determined
by the node density. Thus the neighboring nodes along the path SP p is µ
√
n, where µ is
typically 6 ∼ 8. As some nodes are common neighbors of two consecutive nodes on SP p,
i.e, there is a high probability that the neighbor sets of two nodes will intersect, the actual
value of µ is smaller. Under the assumption that a typical network diameter is
√
n, a total
of O(µ
√
n ·√n) = O(n) Neighbor messages are forwarded. In the worst case, every node in
the network is within the radio range of at least one of the nodes on the path SP p. In this
case all nodes report their neighbor lists and thus the overhead could be O(n2) in the worst
case and O(n3/2) on average. However, in such a case, a least cost path is guaranteed to be
found as the information on the whole graph is available to the source node. To summarize
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the two stages, a single discovery incurs a message overhead of O(n2) in the worst case and
O(n) on average.
4.4.3 Payment Calculation
4.4.3.1 Payment to Route Discovery
We pay a unit amount for each node to forward a routing message. This unit payment can
cover the maximum cost of a node for routing a message. Payment for a route discovery
consists of two parts. The first part pays nodes involved in flooding RREQ. Every node
broadcasts RREQ exactly once. The second part pays nodes involved in the Neighbor
message reporting. Every node that overhears the RREP message along SP hop sends its
neighbor list to the source using a Neighbor message. The message may be relayed by
several intermediate nodes. Since a Neighbor message uses source routing, the source
node can determine all the intermediate nodes that relayed the message by checking the
header of the Neighbor message. Upon receiving a Neighbor message, the source increases
the corresponding credits for the nodes forwarding the packet, and for the initiator of a
Neighbor message.
4.4.3.2 Payment for Data Forwarding
Payment calculation for data forwarding is based on subgraph Gp only. Nodes not in Gp
get no payment for data forwarding. Nodes not on the least cost path get no payment for
data transmissions. Payment to the nodes on the least cost path is calculated according to
the VCG mechanism, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.
4.4.4 Truthfulness Analysis
We show that telling the truth about its cost is a node’s dominant strategy. Path selection
is determined in two stages. In the first stage, SP hop is chosen. SP hop is the path along
which the first RREQ arrives at the destination. It is not dependent on the declared
emitting power or cost per unit of power of any node. Thus a node’s under-declaration or
over-declaration of its cost makes no sense at this stage. In the second stage, SP p is found.
After SP hop is found, the subgraph Gp is constructed based on neighbor list information of
nodes along and around SP hop. The payment to nodes in the subgraph Gp is determined
by applying the VCG mechanism. Only links in the subgraph are used. A link lij ’s cost
is determined by the sender i and the receiver j. As shown in Section 4.3.3, nodes in the
subgraph have no incentive to lie about their cost.
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4.4.5 Performance Evaluation
We conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of our protocol
on a network with selfish nodes. We compared the proposed protocol with the ad hoc-VCG
protocol [33]. In the following discussion, vcg stands for the ad hoc-VCG protocol [33] while
lstop stands for the proposed protocol LSTOP. The same parameters used for simulating
LOTTO were used in the simulations.
In our simulation study, we evaluate the same metrics that we evaluated for LOTTO, i.e.,
packet delivery ratio, overhead, end-to-end delay, overpayment, and energy consumption.
In addition, we evaluate a new metric, approximation ratio, defined as follows,
• The approximation ratio of cost is the ratio of total cost of nodes based on lstop to
that based on the whole graph (which gives the optimal solution, i.e., least cost paths).
Similarly, the approximation ratio of payment is the ratio of total payment plus cost of
source nodes based on lstop to that based on the whole graph. Approximation ratio shows
how well lstop approaches the optimal solution.
4.4.5.1 Approximation Ratio
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Figure 4.6: Approximation ratio
To study the approximation ratio of lstop, we collected the entire topology. Based on
this, we applied the VCG mechanism to calculate the total cost on the least cost paths
and total payment to all intermediate nodes for data traffic. As the paths found based on
the whole graph and those based on the sub graph may be different, mobility may cause
different link breakages and thus results in different route discoveries. To allow comparison,
we set the network to be static.
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Figure 4.6 shows the approximation ratio of cost and payment with respect to node
density. Both the approximation ratio of cost and the approximation ratio of payment
are almost equal to 1. As the network area increases, i.e., node density decreases, the
approximation ratio changes very little. The highest approximation ratio for either cost
or payment is less than 1.007. It shows that selecting a path using lstop approaches the
optimal solution of selecting a path based on the whole topology of a network with sufficient
high density.
4.4.5.2 Impact of Mobility
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Figure 4.7: Performance at different speeds for 60 nodes
4.4.5.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 4.7(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to maximum speed. We observe that lstop provides much higher packet delivery
ratio than vcg. As mobility increases, the packet delivery ratio of lstop drops slightly. The
mobility increases link breakages and thus results in more packet drops. When a link breaks,
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lstop can find new paths to the destinations quickly with low overhead (See subsection 4.4.2).
On the contrary, vcg ’s packet delivery ratio drops dramatically with an increase in mobility.
This can be ascribed to three reasons, as discussed in Section 4.3.5.1. First, vcg ’s large
number of RREQs cause much delay in message propagation and the source is very likely
to collect outdated route information. Second, large numbers of RREQ messages cause
severe overflow of the network output queues and thus a lot of packets are dropped. Third,
a large number of RREQ messages causes severe radio interference [75], resulting in data
packets drops.
4.4.5.2.2 Overhead Fig. 4.7(b) shows the overhead with respect to maximum speed.
We observe that lstop’s overhead is significantly (by 2 magnitudes of order) lower than
that of vcg. In vcg, each node forwards (broadcasts) every RREQ message carrying link
information unknown to it and thus a node forwards O(n2) RREQ messages, resulting in
a total of O(n3) overhead for a route discovery. On the contrary, in lstop, every node sends
only one RREQ message and one Neighbor message, which may be forwarded for several
hops, for a route discovery, resulting in a total overhead of O(n2) in the worst case and
O(n) on average. As mobility increases, the overhead increases in both protocols because
higher mobility results in more link breakages, and thus results in more RERRs and new
route discoveries.
4.4.5.2.3 End-to-end Delay Fig. 4.7(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to
maximum speed. lstop’s end-to-end delay is between 0.06∼0.07 second and is on the
horizontal axis. We observe that lstop’s end-to-end delay is significantly (by 2 magnitudes
of order) lower than that of vcg. This is due to the reasons discussed in Section 4.3.5.1.
First, vcg takes a long time to discover a route. Second, multiple route discoveries for a
single route request increase the delay. Third, congestion and long queues in the MAC layer
increase the delay.
As the mobility increases, the end-to-end delay increases for vcg. Higher mobility causes
more link breakages and thus results in new route discoveries, producing more RREQ
messages. This in turn slows down route discoveries and causes even longer output queues
in MAC layer.
4.4.5.2.4 Energy Consumption Fig. 4.7(d) shows the energy consumed in sending
packets with respect to maximum speed. We observe that lstop consumes much less energy
than vcg because it sends far less control packets than vcg. As mobility increases, the energy
59
consumption increases for both protocols because an increase in mobility results in more
route discoveries, which causes transmission of more control packets and thus consumes
more energy.
4.4.5.3 Impact of the Network Size
These simulations were conducted with a density of one node per 6000 m2 and a maximum
speed of 5 m/s, and the number of nodes was changed from 50 to 90.
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Figure 4.8: Performance for different numbers of nodes
4.4.5.3.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 4.8(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to the number of nodes. We observed that the packet delivery ratio of lstop
was significantly higher than that of vcg. This is due to the reasons discussed in
Section 4.3.5.1(a). As the number of nodes increases, the network area increases and the
average hop count of a path increases, and thus node mobility is more likely to cause
link breakages. In addition, an increase in the number of nodes results in an increase in
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the number of links, and therefore route discoveries in vcg need more time to collect link
information. The selected paths are more likely to be outdated, causing more link breakages.
An increase in link breakages increases the number of packets drops and route discoveries,
which generates more control messages particularly for vcg, thus making the situation worse.
4.4.5.3.2 Overhead Fig. 4.8(b) shows the overhead with respect to the number of
nodes. We observe that the overhead of lstop is far lower (by 2 magnitudes of order) than
that of vcg. This is because vcg generates an O(n3) overhead while lstop generates an
overhead of O(n) on average. As the number of nodes increases, the overhead increases
for both protocols for two reasons. First, an increase in the number of nodes results in an
increase in the control messages of a route discovery. Second, an increase in the number
of nodes results in more link breakages, as discussed above, and thus results in more route
discoveries.
To further analyze the overhead, we normalized the overhead as control packets per route
discovery, including RREQ messages, Neighbor messages and RREP messages. Table 4.4
shows the overhead per route discovery with different numbers of nodes. The overhead of
lstop is almost 2 orders of magnitude lower than that of vcg.
nodes 50 60 70 80 90
lstop 114 136 160 183 206
vcg 15743 18479 21676 23187 24513
Table 4.4: Average overhead per route discovery with fixed node density
4.4.5.3.3 End-to-end Delay Fig. 4.8(c) shows the end-to-end delay with respect to
the number of nodes. The delay of lstop is around 0.1 second and is on the horizontal axis.
We observe that lstop incurs a far shorter delay (by 2 order of magnitude) than vcg. This is
further discussed in Section 4.3.5.1(c). As the number of nodes increases, the delay increases
for vcg. An increase in the number of nodes increases the number of control messages, and
thus results in longer output queues and increases the queue overflow and congestion in the
MAC layer. Longer output queues and congestion increase the data packets’ waiting time.
Queue overflow causes the failure of route discovery. Route discoveries need more time to
collect link information. Both result in data packets’ waiting at the source nodes’ buffers
for a longer period of time.
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4.4.5.3.4 Overpayment Ratio Fig. 4.8(d) shows the overpayment ratio with respect
to the number of nodes. The ratio changes a little for both protocols as the number of
nodes changes. vcg ’s overpayment ratio is a little higher than that of lstop. It implies that
lstop can find better paths than vcg. The main reason is that in vcg with node mobility, it
is difficult to collect complete link information to get the most effective routes. Therefore
the most effective overpayment ratio is not achieved.
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Figure 4.9: (a) Performance for different densities with 60 nodes
4.4.5.4 Impact of Node Density
These simulations were conducted with 60 nodes and a maximum node speed of 5 m/s, and
the network area was changed from 600*600 m2 to 900*900m2.
4.4.5.4.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Fig. 4.9(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with
respect to the size of network area. We observe that lstop provides a much higher delivery
ratio over vcg. This is discussed further in Section 6.4.1(a). As the area increases (i.e., the
density decreases), the packet delivery ratio decreases for both protocols. This is because
an increase in the area increases the probability of nodes’ moving out of each other’s radio
range, and increases the hop counts of data transmission paths, causing more link breakages
and more packet drops.
4.4.5.4.2 Overhead Fig. 4.9(b) shows the overhead with respect to size of the network
area. We observe that lstop incurs a far lower overhead than vcg as vcg generates O(n3)
RREQ messages for route discoveries. As the network area increases (i.e., the density
decreases), the overhead of lstop increases. This is because an increase in the area results
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in more link breakages, resulting in increased route discoveries, which incurs more control
messages. Vcg ’s overhead decreases as node density decreases. This is because, as the
network area increases, with a fixed number of nodes, the number of links in the network
decrease and thus the number of RREQ messages (which include links information) per
route discovery decrease. Although the number of route discoveries increases due to an
increase in link breakages, the decrease in per route discovery overhead outweighs the
increase in the number of route discoveries.
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Figure 4.10: Performance of different loads with 60 nodes
4.4.5.5 Impact of Load
4.4.5.5.1 Packet Delivery Ratio These simulations were conducted with 60 nodes
and a maximum speed of 5 m/s, and the number of flows was changed from 6 to 14.
Fig. 4.10(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with respect to the number of flows. We
observe that lstop provides a much greater packet delivery ratio than vcg (See Section
6.4.1(a)). As load increases, the packet delivery ratio of lstop changes little, whereas that
of vcg decreases. This is because an increase in the number of flows increases the output
queue overflow, packet collisions and interference, causing more packet drops.
4.4.5.5.2 Overhead Fig. 4.10(b) shows the overhead with respect to the number of
flows. We observe that lstop causes far lower (about 2 order of magnitude) overhead than
vcg since vcg generates O(n3) RREQ messages for route discoveries. In lstop, an increase
in the number of flows causes an increase in route discoveries, resulting in an increase in
overhead. Vcg ’s overhead changes a little with respect to the number of flows. This is
because, with more flows, each route discovery collects significantly fewer RREQ messages
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due to collisions and interference of these RREQ messages. Also, due to bounded simulation
time, the long route discovery restricts the number of new route discoveries.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have presented two low overhead truthful routing protocols, LOTTO
and LSTOP. We introduced a simple and effective way to collect the topology information
of the network. Each node needs to broadcast one RREQ message instead of O(n2) [33].
By applying the VCG mechanism, both LOTTO and LSTOP guarantee that nodes get
enough payment and have no incentive to cheat over their cost. LOTTO achieves cost
efficiency by finding the least cost path from the source node to the destination node. The
most prominent feature of LOTTO is that it reduces overhead from O(n3) [33] to O(n2)
and greatly mitigates message congestion and queue overflows in the MAC layer. LSTOP,
on the other hand, approaches an optimal routing solution in a dense network and incurs
extremely low overhead of O(n) on average and O(n2) in the worst case, thus providing far
better performance and scalability.
We conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate our protocols and compare
them with the ad hoc-VCG protocol [33]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
conduct an extensive simulation study for mechanism design methods to evaluate important
network metrics such as packet delivery ratio, overhead and end-to-end delay.
Simulation results show that LOTTO achieves a much higher packet delivery ratio,
generates much lower overhead and has much lower end-to-end delay than ad hoc-VCG,
while LSTOP achieves an even better performance, by generating 2 orders of magnitude
lower overhead, and end-to-end delay in comparison to ad hoc-VCG.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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Chapter 5
Achieving Multipath Truthful Routing
5.1 Introduction
On-demand routing protocols [13, 19] establish paths to respective destinations only when
necessary, and maintain only the active routes between sources and destinations, thereby
reducing the control overhead. Similarly, on-demand multipath routing protocols [76, 16, 77]
establish multiple paths to a given destination in a single route discovery phase. Multiple
paths to a destination provide better fault-tolerance to path-breaks. In case of on-demand
multipath protocols, a new route discovery (which typically requires a network-wide flooding
of a route request message) is necessary only when all paths to a given destination break.
Thus, they provide an (overhead) efficient means to recover from routing failure when
compared to single path on-demand routing protocols.
One might think that truthfulness in conjunction with loop-free routing implies increased
complexity of protocol design, and consequently the related control overhead. On the
contrary, we present here a generic mechanism [36] that makes any table-driven multipath
routing protocol a truthful one, without introducing additional control messages and prove
its truthfulness. As an instance of implementation, we present a Truthful Multipath Routing
Protocol (TMRP) which is based on AOMDV [77]. TMRP establishes multiple loop-free
paths to a given destination and incurs only 2n control overhead, asymptotically the same
as AOMDV.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides the system
model and preliminaries. Section 5.3 presents the generic truthful multipath routing
mechanism GTMR. Section 5.4 presents TMRP, an example of GTMR. Section 5.5 presents
a performance evaluation of TMRP through simulations. Section 5.6 summarizes the
chapter.
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5.2 System Model and Preliminaries
We use the well known Unit Disk Graph (UDG) model for ad-hoc networks. In a UDG,
nodes are distributed in a two dimensional Euclidean plane. All nodes use a constant radio
range assumed to be normalized to 1. The nodes u and v in a UDG are connected iff the
Euclidean distance between them uv ≤ 1. The network is assumed to be dense enough such
that there is more than one path between any two nodes in the network, unless the two
nodes are direct neighbors.
Nodes in the network are selfish and rational, but not malicious and do not collude.
Each node uses constant power to send packets and it incurs the same cost to send a
packet to different neighbors. However, the value of a node’s forwarding cost may vary
over time 1. Since different nodes may incur different costs for packet forwarding, it is
desirable to pay nodes according to their cost. As with other truthful routing protocols,
nodes assume a payment mechanism [78] that takes care of accounting and transferring
payments between nodes. Tamper-proof hardware [42] can also be used to protect virtual
money from modification or other attacks.
5.2.1 A Hello Protocol
Nodes use Hello messages to exchange bid (cost) information. Each node establishes a
neighbor table to record its neighbors’ information. The neighbor table consists of multiple
entries, each corresponding to a neighbor. A neighbor table entry includes the fields
<IDi, Costi, TSi>, where IDi is the neighbor node’s identity, Costi is its cost of sending
one packet and TSi is the time of establishing this entry, respectively. Fig. 5.1 shows an
example of a node’s neighbor table.
Further, Hello messages are also used to refresh routing tables. A node has multiple
valid paths to a destination. Whenever a path is used to forward packets, the corresponding
route entry in the routing table is refreshed. If a node tends to select the same next hop to
forward packets, only limited paths will be refreshed during a given period. All other valid
path entries will be timed out gradually. These paths will not be “fresh” enough and they
will become invalid paths even if they are in existence. This may result in unnecessary route
discoveries since our auction mechanism requires multiple paths. With the help of Hello
messages, nodes refresh valid paths periodically. When a node X receives a Hello message
from a neighbor, and if the neighbor is on a valid path, X increases the link life time for
the neighbor by a predetermined number of time units.
1For example, a node’s cost increases when its battery power becomes low.
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Each node maintains two timers: a hello timer (HT ) and a neighbor table flush timer
(NTFT ). Upon the expiration of HT , each node broadcasts a Hello message. A Hello
message includes the fields <ID, Cost>, corresponding to its identity and cost of sending a
packet, respectively. Upon receiving a Hello message, neighbors add an entry corresponding
to the issuer of the Hello message into neighbor tables if it is not already present, or refresh
the entry. The nodes then reset the NTFT for this entry. A node also refreshes its neighbor
entry when it overhears the corresponding neighbor’s sending packet. Upon the expiration of
NTFT , a node checks the timestamp of the entry. If the entry is older than a predetermined
period (typically 2 Hello intervals), the node deletes it from its neighbor table.
5.2.2 An Introduction of an Auction
In GTMR, nodes use an auction-based approach to select the next hop for packet forwarding.
To clarify, we briefly describe the auction schemes below.
An auction is a gathering of persons to bid for an item/good according to certain rules
declared a priori. It has been used since prehistory and is still a very common mechanism
in today’s economics. According to the rules and information known to the bidders, an
auction can be classified into different types [57]. For example, the bidders can make their
bids simultaneously where each bidder puts his bid into a sealed envelop, or sequentially,
where the auctioneer gives successive bids and the bidders vie for those bids. An auction can
also be classified based on how the winner is selected and payed. In the first-price scheme,
the winner is the one who bids the highest (lowest) price and pays (receives) the same. In
the second-price scheme the winner is the one who bids the highest (lowest) price but pays
(receives) the second-best price quoted by the bidders. The second-price sealed bid auction
is well studied in economics theory. This auction is also known as a Vickrey auction, named
after Richard Vickrey, a Nobel Prize winner in economics. One of the salient features of
this auction is that making bids equal to their true valuations is the dominant strategy for
the bidders to win the auction. By doing so, bidders will always get non-negative utilities
(payoffs).
5.3 A Generic Protocol
In this section we present a generic truthful multipath routing protocol GTMR that
transforms any table-driven multipath routing protocol MRP into a truthful protocol, if
the MRP satisfies the following two general requirements:
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R1 The MRP must establish and maintain multiple loop-free paths to each destination,
such that each intermediate node has at least two next hop neighbors.
R2 The MRP must be table-driven, i.e., each intermediate node should maintain only next
hop(s) for different destinations in a routing table.
Loop-freedom is a basic requirement for any routing protocol, while multiple-path and
table-driven routing are necessary for establishing auctions. Furthermore, in addition to
Hello messages, which are commonly used in ad hoc networks for neighbor discovery, GTMR
uses only the control messages necessary for the proper functioning of MRP.
5.3.1 Description of GTMR
GTMR guarantees the truthfulness of the MRP by establishing a coordination between the
neighbor table and the routing table, which is maintained by the MRP. Fig. 5.1 shows an
example of a node F ’s neighbor table and routing table. A, B, C and E are F ’s direct
neighbors and F has three paths to D through A, B and C. The routing table consists of
destination IDs, next hops and other fields such as sequence number or timestamp, distance
to the destination or height, etc., depending on the multipath routing protocol being used.
Generally, to forward packets, an MRP selects a single next hop towards the destination,
among available multiple next hops, using selection policies like round-robin (in the order of
path creation), least hop, or random. However, in GTMR, the next hop selection is based
on the bid value (for packet forwarding). Precisely, for each packet, nodes select a next hop
by using the second-bid auction scheme. In a later subsection we show that such a next-hop
selection guarantees truthfulness.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of node F ’s neighbor table and routing table
Nodes establish neighbor tables using the hello protocol described in Section 5.2.1, in
which nodes exchange periodic Hello messages containing their bid values. The bid value
specified by a node in the Hello message represents the bid (cost) for which it is willing
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to forward a packet from its neighbors. It is valid for a hello period (typically one or two
seconds). By exchanging bid values proactively via Hello messages, nodes declare a priori
the bids (cost) per packet-forwarding without any bias towards neighboring nodes.
Upon receiving a packet destined for a certain node, a node F selects a next hop using
the second-price sealed bid auction scheme. All neighboring nodes of F that are next hops
towards the destination in F ’s routing table are qualified bidders. From this point view of
the node that is selecting a next hop, i.e., F , is an auctioneer. Note that nodes do not bid
for each packet. Instead they advertise their bids (on a per packet basis) periodically by
attaching them in their periodic Hello messages. Since the Hello interval is very short, it
is reasonable to assume that a node’s cost will not change during that period.
Let the set of qualified bidders be N obtained from the routing-table of the node F .
F retrieves the bids of qualified bidders from its neighbor table and compares these bids.
The winner of the bid is a node N ∈ N that seeks the least cost for forwarding packets.
The payment to N will be the second least cost (bid) among nodes in N . If more than one
neighboring node seeks the least bid value, then F randomly selects one of them. However,
the payment to this node is the same as its bid since the second lowest bid equals the lowest
bid. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code for selecting the next hop.
In cases where the destination is a direct neighbor, no auction is established since the
destination will not forward the packet further and should not get payment. F sends the
packet directly to the destination.
Algorithm 1: A Packet forwarding algorithm
Input: node F , destination D
Output: N // the next hop of F toward D ;
PayN // payment to next hop N
/*Check if multiple paths are available*/;1
if (!IsMultiplePathAvailable(F, D)) then2
send route error message;3
else4
/*NexthopDF is the set of neighbor nodes of F in valid paths toward D*/;5
foreach node j ∈ {NexthopDF } do6
Retrieve Costj from the neighbor table;7
Record the lowest cost min and the second lowest cost minnext;8
if Costj is lowest then9
N = j;10
PayN = minnext;11
end12
end13
return (N ,PayN);14
end15
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After selecting the next hop node N , F adds the node ID N and its payment PayN to
the packet header, and forwards the packet to node N . Under the assumption that nodes are
selfish but not malicious, a forwarding node N is not supposed to modify its payment PayN .
Otherwise, tamper-proof hardware [42] can be used to protect this payment information
from modification or other attacks.
In addition, two methods can be applied to avoid such modifications. The first method
resorts to cryptography. Besides items N and PayN , F calculates a MAC (Message
Authentication Code) over these two items, digitally signs it with its private key, and
appends this MAC to the packet. When the destination receives the packet, it can verify
the amount of payments. The second method resorts to neighbor monitoring. Neighbor
monitoring is a key mechanism in detection-based methods for the selfish-node problem.
Each node works in the promiscuous mode and can overhear packets transmitted by
nodes within the radio range. To prevent the modification of payment amount PayN ,
each neighboring node of F saves the overheard packet P sent to N in its buffer. Upon
overhearing packet P sent out from node N , they compare the corresponding header area
of two instances of packet P and check if PayN is modified.
Lemma 5.3.1. Given an MRP that establishes and maintains loop-free multiple paths to
each destination, the packet forwarding algorithm of GTMR routes a packet along a loop-free
path to the destination.
Proof. The proof follows from the loop-freedom insured by MRP. Let H(D)i represent a set
of next hops for the destination D, maintained by node i in its routing table. If j ∈ H(D)i,
then the hop-distance of j towards the destination is strictly shorter than the hop-distance
of i towards the destination (along j). Since the packet forwarding algorithm of GTMR
selects a next hop from H(D)i at each intermediate node i, the path traced by packet using
the forwarding algorithm of GTMR contains only those nodes which strictly decrease the
hop-distance to the destination, which implies loop-freedom.
5.3.2 Truthfulness of GTMR
In this section, we show that truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each node for
GTMR. It is important to note that a source node pays other nodes but not itself, and
conducts an auction for other nodes only. Neither destination node gets payment.
Theorem 5.3.2. Given an MRP that establishes and maintains a routing table containing
multiple routes to each destination, bidding true cost is the dominant strategy for every
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qualified bidder, when the next hop (a bidder) is selected using the packet forwarding
algorithm of GTMR.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to show that any bidder i, will benefit only when it
bids its true cost [57] (sent in a Hello message).
Suppose a bidder i with true cost vi declares a bid bi. Let i’s utility be ui. Let m
−i
denote the minimum bid besides bi. According to the auction rule, the winner of the auction
receives the second-best (second-least) bid quoted by the bidders and the other bidders get
nothing. Thus the utility ui of a bidder i is
ui =
{
m−i − vi, bi < m−i
0, bi > m
−i
There are two possibilities: Bidder i may over-bid or under-bid its cost vi [57].
Case of over-bidding: If the bid is higher than the cost, i.e., bi > vi, then there are
three possibilities.
1. If bi < m
−i, then i wins the auction and ui = m
−i − vi. However, i can get the same
payoff by bidding its cost vi.
2. If vi < m
−i < bi, then i loses the auction and gets zero payoff. However, by bidding
vi, it can get a positive payoff.
3. If m−i < vi, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it if it had bid vi.
Thus, i has no incentive for over-bidding.
Case of under-bidding: If the bid is lower than the cost, i.e., bi < vi, then there are
three possibilities.
1. If vi < m
−i, then i gets payoff m−i − vi, the same as if it had bid vi.
2. If bi < m
−i < vi, then i gets a negative payoff as m
−i − vi < 0. However, by bidding
vi, i gets zero payment, which is better than a negative payoff.
3. If bi > m
−i, then i gets zero payoff, the same as if it had bid vi.
Thus, i has no incentive for under-bidding.
In both the cases i’s dominant strategy is to bid its cost vi, and hence the theorem.
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5.4 A Truthful Multipath Routing protocol
In this section, we present an instance of GTMR based on the Ad-hoc On-demand
Multipath Distance Vector routing protocol (AOMDV) [77]. AOMDV satisfies the general
requirements specified in the previous section. We call this instance of GTMR with AOMDV
a Truthful Multipath Routing Protocol (TMRP). To clarify, we first explain the AOMDV
protocol. Then, we present a detailed description of TMRP.
5.4.1 AOMDV
AOMDV [77] is an extension to AODV [19] that aims to find multiple paths, especially
link-disjoint paths. Like AODV, AOMDV is based on a distance vector concept and uses
hop-by-hop routing. Moreover, it ensures loop-freedom.
In AOMDV, when a source has packets to send to a destination and finds no routes in its
routing table, it invokes route discovery by broadcasting RREQ packets. Route discovery in
AOMDV is similar to AODV. An RREQ packet in AOMDV includes all fields that occur in
AODV. It includes an additional field called the last hop2, i.e., the neighboring node of the
source. This information and the next hop information, i.e., the node from which to receive
the RREQ, are used to achieve link disjointness for reverse paths to the source [77]. A
node may receive multiple duplicate RREQ packets. For each packet received, it examines
if an alternate reverse path to the source can be formed such that loop-freedom and link-
disjointness are preserved.
Upon establishing a reverse path to the source, an intermediate node checks if it has any
valid paths to the destination. If so, it generates an RREP packet, including a forwarding
path not used in any previous RREP s for this RREQ, and sends the RREP back to the
source through the reverse path. Otherwise, it checks if it has forwarded this request before
and forwards it it has not.
Upon receiving a RREQ packet, the destination tries to form a reverse path to the
source as above. It then generates a RREP packet for each RREQ copy that arrives
through a loop-free path to the source. Multiple RREP s intend to increase the probability
of finding multiple disjoint paths.
Upon receiving an RREP packet, an intermediate node checks if it can form a loop-free
and disjoint path to the destination using the same rule as when it receives a RREQ packet.
If not, it drops the RREP . Otherwise, it checks if there are any reverse paths to the source
2The last hop of a path to a destination is the node just proceeding the destination on that path.
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that has not been used to forward an RREP for this route discovery. If so, it chooses one
of the unused reverse paths to forward the RREP . Otherwise, it drops the packet.
Loop-freedom is guaranteed by satisfying the following sufficient conditions: 1) The
sequence rule. For each destination, multiple paths maintained by a node should have
the same sequence number, i.e., the highest known destination sequence. 2) For the same
destination sequence number, a node never advertises a route shorter than one already
advertised, and never accepts a route longer than one already advertised. More details and
a proof are available in [77].
Route maintenance is also very similar to AODV. Upon link breakage of the last path
to the destination, a node generates or forwards a RERR packet.
5.4.2 An Implementation of Multipath Routing
AOMDV [77] is a reactive hop-by-hop routing protocol which finds node/link disjoint
multiple paths. However, it cannot guarantee finding multiple paths from a node. In
AOMDV, a node forwards packets as long as there is one path to the destination. On
the other hand, TMRP requires multiple paths from a node to establish an auction. To
achieve this, upon receiving a packet, an intermediate node checks if it has at least two
valid next hop nodes to the destination. An exception is that an intermediate node is the
direct neighbor of the destination. In that case the intermediate node forwards the packet
directly to the destination. If no multiple paths are available, the node drops the packet
and sends an RERR packet. While keeping most implementation of AOMDV, especially
the necessary condition for loop-freedom, and thus keeping the feature of loop-freedom, we
modify AOMDV implementation to satisfy general requirements for auctions.
We modified AOMDV to maximize the number of multiple paths. First, we relax the
requirement for node/link disjoint paths. Node/link disjointedness is a good feature for
routing robustness. However, it limits the number of multiple paths. Second, the RREP
packet is handled in the same manner as RREQ packets. RREP is also flooded over the
whole network. Whenever a node receives an RREP packet, it examines if it can form
an alternate reverse path to the destination. If so, it checks if it has forwarded the first
copy of RREP for this route discovery and forwards it if it has not. Otherwise, it drops
the RREP . Third, while guaranteeing that each node maintains routes only to the highest
known destination sequence number, we changed the rule for sequence number updating in
case of link breakages and link timeout so that the sequence number will not be changed
during the propagation of RREP s. A node may change the destination sequence number
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included in an RREP if it has a higher one. Upon receiving a copy of RREP with a higher
destination sequence number, a node creates a new route to replace valid routes created
by RREP copies with lower destination sequence numbers and thus reduces the number of
multiple paths.
We do not allow an intermediate node to generate an RREP even if it has multiple
valid forwarding paths to the destination. Only the destination can generate RREP s for
a route discovery. By doing so, all nodes have chances to refresh their routing entries to
this destination and get more accurate routing information. Also periodic Hello messages
instead of adaptive Hello messages are used to help maintain routing tables, as discussed
in Section 5.2.1.
Upon expiration of the timer for a route discovery, the source node checks if it has
established multiple paths to the destination. If not, it retries the route discovery. Upon
receiving a packet, an intermediate node also checks if there are multiple paths to the
destination. If not, it drops the packet and sends (broadcasts) an RERR packet.
Route maintenance is also modified from AOMDV. Upon link breakage, a node on an
active path checks if it still has valid multiple paths to the destination. If not, it generates
an RERR to inform other nodes that it can not reach the destination for auction-based
packet forwarding (it can still reach the destination). A receiver of RERR invalidates the
routing entry corresponding to the RERR initiator and repeats the above actions.
5.4.3 TMRP
Nodes establish and maintain multiple routes using a modified version of AOMDV (as
described in Section 5.4.2). Nodes maintain a neighbor table using the hello protocol
described in Section 5.2.1.
We simulated two variations of TMRP for nodal cost. In the first variation, nodes don’t
change their packet forwarding cost over time. In the second variation, a node’s packet
forwarding cost may change over time. A node increases its cost proportionally to the
number of packets sent (or forwarded). However, when a node’s cost reaches an upper
boundary, it goes down to the low boundary. This is to simulate the scenario where a node
can have its battery recharged upon battery depletion.
A good feature of the latter implementation is that it can achieve good load balancing.
Our auction mechanism always selects nodes with the lowest cost as forwarding nodes.
Without changing their cost, nodes with a low cost have a high probability of being
forwarding nodes. They are likely to forward more traffic than other nodes and thus they
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become hot spots or are in hot areas, resulting in packet collisions and radio interferences.
However, if these nodes’ cost increases as the packets are forwarded, their cost will gradually
increase more than other nodes. Thus they are less likely to be selected as forwarding nodes.
Other nodes will get more chances to forward packets. Packets are therefore forwarded along
different paths by different nodes over time and load balance is achieved. Note that such
load balancing does not compromise truthfulness due to the use of the auction mechanism.
To forward packets, nodes use the next hops from the routing table entries, and execute
the packet forwarding algorithm (Algorithm 1) of GTMR with inputs from the neighbor
table. It follows from Lemma 1, that such a forwarding scheme guarantees loop-freedom,
given that the underlying AOMDV is loop-free.
5.4.4 Message complexity
Note that the Hello messages, which are very commonly used by nodes for neighbor
discovery in most ad-hoc networks, are the only additional messages for TMRP, and they
are broadcast only locally.
Compared with AOMDV, TMRP incurs a little higher overhead for route discovery. In
both the protocols, each node except the destination broadcasts an RREQ packet, and thus
a total of n−1 packets are transfered. In TMRP, each node except the source forwards one
RREP packet. Thus n− 1 RREP packets are transfered. On the other hand, in AOMDV,
several instances of RREP s are unicast back to the source, resulting in k
√
n packets on
average and n−1 packets in the worst case, where k is the number of instances. In summary,
a route discovery in TMRP incurs 2n− 2 packets while that in AOMDV incurs n+ k√n on
average. Thus both protocols incur an O(n) overhead. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the lowest overhead incurred by a truthful routing protocol.
The other overhead incurred is due to RERR packets. Upon link breakage, a node sends
an RERR to a destination. The receiver of this packet forwards the RERR if there are
no multiple paths to the destination, excluding the path containing the new link breakage
indicated by the RERR. In the best case, only one node, which is a neighbor of the source,
sends an RERR. In the worst case, which is very unlikely, each node except the source
and the destination sends an RERR and thus at most n − 2 packets are transfered. Our
simulation study shows that only a very small fraction of nodes send RERRs.
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5.5 Performance Evaluation
We conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of TMRP in ad-
hoc networks with selfish nodes. To the best of our knowledge, TMRP is the only truthful
multipath routing protocol in the literature. For this reason, we did not have another
protocol for comparison. Generic routing protocols such as AODV [19] or AOMDV [77] are
not comparable as those protocols work under the different assumption that nodes follow
the protocol accurately and are willing to cooperate.
Our simulations focused on the following five metrics: packet delivery ratio, routing
overhead, average end-to-end delay, overpayment ratio and average hop count, which is the
average number of hops needed from a source to a destination.
We conducted two implementations of TMRP and compared simulation results between
them. In one version, viz. tmrp-c, nodes don’t change their packet forwarding cost during
the simulation. In the other version, viz. tmrp-v, nodes’ cost change over time. A node’s
packet forwarding cost increases proportionally to the number of data and control packets
sent or forwarded. However, when a node’s cost reaches the upper boundary, i.e., 40, it
goes down to the lower boundary, i.e., 20. This is to simulate battery recharging.
We used GloMoSim [64] for our simulations. Unless specified otherwise, the following
parameters were used in the simulations. 100 nodes were initially placed uniformly in an
area of 600m by 1500m. Nodes used a radio range of 250 meters, and picked a packet
forwarding cost randomly between 20 and 40. All nodes followed the Random Way-point
mobility model [65] with a maximum speed of 1 m/s to 10 m/s and a pause time of 30
seconds. Each simulation lasted for 900 seconds. To generate traffic we simulated 10 CBR
flows. Each flow sent four 512-byte data packets per second, starting at 120 seconds and
ending 880 seconds. Nodes used the 802.11 protocol with DCF as the MAC protocol. Data
points represented in a graph were averaged over 20 simulation runs, each with a different
seed.
5.5.1 Impact of Node Mobility
These simulations were conducted with a maximum node speed ranging from 1 to 10 m/s.
5.5.1.1 Packet delivery ratio
Fig. 5.2(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with respect to the maximum node speed. In
both implementations, more than 91% of the packets are delivered. As mobility increases,
the packet delivery ratio drops as mobility increases link breakages, resulting in more packet
76
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  2  4  6  8  10
pa
ck
et
 d
el
iv
er
y 
ra
tio
 (
%
)
maximum speed (m/s)
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 0  2  4  6  8  10
ov
er
he
ad
 (
pa
ck
et
s)
maximum speed (m/s)
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
(a) Packet delivery ratio (b) Routing overhead
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0  2  4  6  8  10
de
la
y 
(s
)
maximum speed (m/s)
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 0  2  4  6  8  10
ov
er
pa
ym
en
t r
at
io
maximum speed (m/s)
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
(c) End-to-end delay (d) Overpayment ratio
Figure 5.2: Performance with respect to mobility.
drops. We didn’t implement local packet salvage, or the packet delivery ratio could have
been higher. We observe that tmrp-v performs better than tmrp-c. This is in tmrp-c, node
cost does not change over time. Nodes with lower cost have a higher probability of being
selected as next hops than those with higher cost. Such nodes are more likely to become
hot nodes or be in a hot area and thus incur more packet collision or radio interference,
resulting in packet drops. On the other hand, in tmrp-v, nodes increase their cost as they
send packets. The more packets sent, the higher the cost. After forwarding packets, hot
nodes have a high cost and are less likely to be continued as next hops. Thus the problem
of hot nodes or hot areas is mitigated. So tmrp-v achieves some good load balancing.
5.5.1.2 Routing Overhead
Fig. 5.2(b) shows the routing overhead with respect to the maximum node speed. TMRP
incurs a 2n overhead per route discovery. As mobility increases, link breakage increases,
resulting in more RERRs and more route discoveries. Thus the overall route overhead
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increases. tmrp-v incurs less overhead than tmrp-c since it mitigates the hot node/area
problem, as discussed above, and thus results in fewer link breakages.
5.5.1.3 End-to-end Delay
Fig. 5.2(c) shows the end-to-end delay with respect to the maximum node speed. The delay
is very low for both versions, and less than 0.09 second for each point. Mobility increases
link breakages, resulting in more route discoveries and thus packets need more time to
reach destinations. tmrp-v incurs a lower delay than tmrp-c since it results in fewer route
discoveries and shorter output queues by avoiding hot nodes/areas.
5.5.1.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 5.2(d) shows the overpayment ratio with respect to maximum node speed. The
overpayment ratio for both versions is lower than 1.12 and varies little over mobility. TMRP
therefore overpays nodes very little over their cost. tmrp-v incurs a lower overpayment ratio
than tmrp-c, as cost change and load balancing may result in less difference between bids
(nodes’ cost).
5.5.2 Impact of Network Size
These simulations were conducted with a density of node/9000m*m and a maximum node
speed of 5 m/s, and the number of nodes was changed from 80 to 120.
5.5.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
Fig. 5.3(a) shows packet delivery ratio with respect to the number of nodes. Both versions
deliver more than 92% of the packets. As the number of nodes increases, the packet delivery
ratio decreases for both versions. An increase in the number of nodes results in an increase
in the network area and an increase in the average hop count of a path, as shown in
Fig. 5.3(e). Thus node mobility is more likely to cause link breakages, resulting in more
packet drops. tmrp-v performs better than tmrp-c due to its load balancing, as discussed
in Section 5.5.1.1.
5.5.2.2 Routing Overhead
Fig. 5.3(b) shows the routing overhead with respect to the number of nodes. As the number
of nodes increases, the overhead increases for both versions. First, more nodes are involved
in routing and thus transfer more control packets. Second, an increase in link breakages
due to an increase in the area results in more RERRs and route discoveries, which incurs
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Figure 5.3: Performance with respect to number of nodes.
more overhead. Due to load balancing, tmrp-v incurs few route discoveries and thus results
in less overhead than tmrp-c.
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5.5.2.3 Average End-to-end Delay
Fig. 5.3(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to the number of nodes. The delay is very
low for both versions and less than 0.09 second for each point. As the number of nodes
increases, the network area increases and the average hop count for a path increases, thereby
increasing end-to-end delay. Also, an increase in nodes results in more contention for the
radio channel. Data packets are likely to need more time to get the channel. Again, tmrp-v
performs better than tmrp-c due to its load balancing.
5.5.2.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 5.3(d) shows overpayment ratio with respect to the number of nodes. The ratio is less
than 1.12 for both versions and does not change over the number of nodes. tmrp-v still
performs better than tmrp-c due to its load balancing.
5.5.2.5 Average Hop Count
Fig. 5.3(e) shows the average hop count of a path with respect to the number of nodes.
As the number of nodes increases, with a fixed node density, the network area increases,
thus the average hop count for a path increases. tmrp-c and tmrp-v generate identical hop
counts. This is because multiple paths from a node to a destination are formed by the
multiple-path routing protocol such that they are no longer than an advertised hop count,
which is set to the length of the longest available path at the time of first advertisement for
a sequence number. These different paths almost have the same length.
5.5.3 Impact of Node Density
These simulations were conducted with a maximum node speed of 5 m/s and the node
density was changed from node/7000m2 to node/11000m2.
5.5.3.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
Fig. 5.4(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with respect to node density. As density
decreases, the network area increases and thus mobility is more likely to cause link breakages,
resulting in more packet drops. Tmrp-v performs better than tmrp-c due to its capacity of
load balancing.
5.5.3.2 Overhead
Fig. 5.4(a) shows the routing overhead with respect to node density. As node density
decreases, the overhead increases. First, an increase in the network area due to a decrease
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Figure 5.4: Performance with respect to node density.
in node density results in more RERRs and more route discoveries. Second, as node density
decreases, a node has fewer neighbors and can form fewer multiple paths. Thus, a route
discovery is more likely to occur.
5.5.3.3 Average End-to-end Delay
Fig. 5.4(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to node density. As node density decreases,
end-to-end delay increases for both versions. A decrease in node density results in an
increase in route discoveries, and thus packets need a longer time to reach destinations.
A decrease in node density also results in an increase in network area, and thus packets
may travel over more hops. Nevertheless, all these end-to-end delays are very low, and the
highest recorded was only 0.11 second.
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5.5.3.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 5.4(d) shows overpayment ratio with respect to node density. The ratio is less than
1.12 for both the versions and does not change over density changes. tmrp-v still performs
better than tmrp-c due to its capacity of load balancing.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 6  8  10  12  14
pa
ck
et
 d
el
iv
er
y 
ra
tio
 (
%
)
number of flows
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
 6  8  10  12  14
ov
er
he
ad
 (
pa
ck
et
s)
number of flows
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
(a) Packet delivery ratio (b) Routing overhead
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 6  8  10  12  14
de
la
y 
(s
)
number of flows
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 6  8  10  12  14
ov
er
pa
ym
en
t r
at
io
number of flows
tmrp-c
tmrp-v
(c) End-to-end delay (d) Overpayment ratio
Figure 5.5: Performance with respect to load.
5.5.4 Impact of Load
These simulations were conducted with a maximum node speed of 5 m/s and the number
of flows was changed from 6 to 14.
5.5.4.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
Fig. 5.5(a) shows packet delivery ratio with respect to the number of flows. As load increases,
the packet delivery ratio decreases for both the versions. This is because an increase in the
number of flows increases the number of data and control packets, resulting in more packet
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collisions and more severe radio interference, which cause more packet drops. Tmrp-v
delivers more packets than tmrp-c due to load balancing.
5.5.4.2 Overhead
Fig. 5.5(b) shows routing overhead with respect to the number of flows. As the load
increases, the overhead increases, as an increase in flow results in more route discoveries. In
addition, a heavier load results in more packet drops, as discussed above, producing more
RERRs and causing even more route discoveries. tmrp-v incurs less overhead than tmrp-c
as it invokes less route discoveries.
5.5.4.3 Average End-to-end Delay
Fig. 5.5(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to the number of flows. As flows increase,
the delay increases for both versions. A heavier load increases the number of packets and
thus increases the contention for a radio channel. Nodes need more time to get the radio
channel to transfer packets. This results in a longer route discovery and slower data packet
forwarding. Tmrp-v incurs shorter delay than tmrp-c since it invokes fewer route discoveries
and has a shorter output queue by avoiding hot nodes/areas.
5.5.4.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 5.5(d) shows overpayment ratio with respect to the number of flows. The ratio is less
than 1.12 for both versions and does not change over the number of flows. Tmrp-v performs
better than tmrp-c due to its capacity of load balancing.
5.6 Chapter Summary
We presented a generic method, GTMR, to transform a table-driven multipath routing
protocol into a truthful routing protocol. By applying an auction mechanism for packet
forwarding, GTMR achieves truthfulness and stimulates nodes to declare their true cost.
As an example of implementation, we presented TMRP, a Truthful Multipath Routing
Protocol which is based on the AOMDV protocol. A prominent feature of TMRP is that
it incurs only 2n control packets for a route discovery and needs no new types of control
messages over AOMDV. To the best of our knowledge, this is the lowest overhead incurred
for truthful routing protocols. TMRP can also achieve load balancing without compromising
truthfulness. We have proved that GTMR guarantees truthfulness and thus TMRP. We also
conducted an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of two variations of
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TMRP. Simulation results showed that TMRP provided high packet delivery ratio and had
low overhead and low end-to-end delay without compromising the overpayment of nodes.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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Chapter 6
Truthful Greedy Forwarding
6.1 Introduction
Geographic routing protocols [79, 80, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 81, 82, 83, 84], also known as
position-based routing protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks use the position information
of nodes in the network for routing and location service. Unlike topology-based routing
protocols [19, 13], nodes in geographic routing protocols do not establish or maintain routes
in the network. A node forwards packets towards a destination solely based on the position
of the destination, its own position, and the position of neighboring nodes. By using only
local topological information, geographic routing protocols cope with node mobility, and
exhibit better scalability than topology-based routing protocols [79].
Recent research [33, 73, 39, 38] has focused on designing truthful protocols for the selfish-
node problem in the context of topology-based routing protocols. Such protocols rely on
the discovery and maintenance of routes in the network, which require substantial overhead
(in the order of O(n3) [33, 73] control messages, where n is the number of nodes in the
network). On the other hand, geographic forwarding incurs a localized overhead of control
messages [79]. It is therefore desirable that a geographic forwarding algorithm designed to
cope with selfish nodes should also be localized in nature.
In this chapter, we present such an algorithm, viz., the T ruthful Geographic Forwarding
algorithm (TGF ) [37] for data forwarding in ad-hoc networks. TGF introduces three
auction-based packet forwarding schemes that guarantee truthfulness while maintaining the
localized nature of geographic forwarding. We prove that TGF is truthful, statistically
analyze the average progress made per hop for proposed auction-based packet forwarding
schemes, and present results from our extensive simulation study. To the best of our
knowledge, TGF is the first algorithm to address truthfulness in the context of geographic
forwarding.
We have used the same system model as in Chapter 5. Additionally, each node knows its
own position by means of a positioning system such as GPS, and reveals its true position.
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Furthermore, the source node is assumed to know the position of the destination [85, 86, 87,
82, 88]. The network is assumed to be dense enough such that there is more than one path
between any two nodes in the network, and avoids dead-ends due to geographic forwarding.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the truthful
geographic forwarding protocol, Section 6.3 presents an analysis of TGF, Section 6.4 presents
the performance evaluation through simulations and Section 6.5 summarizes the chapter.
6.2 Truthful Geographic Forwarding
6.2.1 The Basic Idea
The truthful geographic forwarding algorithm (TGF) is a combination of greedy forwarding
with an auction scheme. Unlike pure greedy forwarding where the selection of the next hop
is based on the progress (Euclidean distance) made towards the destination, in TGF the
selection of the next hop is based on a combination of bid value (for packet forwarding)
along with progress made by the node towards the destination. To achieve this, nodes
exchange periodic Hello messages containing their positions and bid values, and establish
neighbor tables. The bid value specified by a node in the Hello message represents its bid
(cost) for which it is willing to forward a packet from its neighbors. This bid value in a Hello
message is valid for a hello period (typically one or two seconds). By exchanging bid values
proactively via Hello messages, nodes declare a priori the bids (cost) per packet-forwarding
without any bias towards neighboring nodes.
When a node has a packet to forward to the destination, it uses an auction scheme to
select a next hop for the destination from its neighbors. As the bid values and the positions
of the neighbors are known a priori (because of Hello message exchange) selecting a next
hop requires a neighbor table look-up and selecting a neighbor according to the auction
scheme. The auction scheme(s) guarantee that TGF is truthful. It is important to note
that the control overhead incurred by TGF is only due to the Hello messages, which are
one hop broadcast messages. Thus, the control overhead of TGF is O(1) per node every t
seconds, where t is the hello interval.
6.2.2 Packet Forwarding
Generally, geographic routing protocols [79] use greedy forwarding in which a node forwards
a packet to a node that is geographically closest to its destination among neighboring nodes.
However, this approach is not suitable in the context of selfish nodes, where nodes are more
interested in cost and payment. To address this issue TGF takes into account the cost
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of packet forwarding of nodes, and forces nodes to show their true cost. TGF uses three
forwarding schemes, the basic scheme, the restricting bidders scheme, and the unit price
bid scheme.
6.2.2.1 Basic Forwarding Scheme (BaFS)
Upon receiving a packet destined for a certain node, node F selects the next hop using the
second-price sealed bid auction scheme. All neighboring nodes of F that make progress
towards the destination are qualified bidders, and F is an auctioneer. Nodes do not bid for
each packet. Instead they bid on a per packet basis periodically by attaching bids to their
periodic Hello messages.
Let D(a, b) be the Euclidean distance between node a and node b, and NBa be the set
of neighboring nodes of a. Then, the qualified bidders K ∈ NBF are nodes that satisfy
the condition D(K,D) < D(F,D), where D is the destination ID. We denote the set of
qualified bidders as N . The winner of the bid is node N ∈ N that seeks the lowest cost for
forwarding packets. The payment to N will be the second least bid among nodes in N . If
there is more than one neighboring node seeking the lowest bid value, the node making the
maximum progress towards the destination (i.e., having min(D(K,D))) will be the winner.
However, the payment to this node is the same as its bid, since the second lowest bid equals
the lowest bid. After selecting the next hop node N , F adds the node identity N and its
payment PayN to the packet header, and forwards the packet to node N . The same method
as discussed in Section 5.3.1 can be used to secure payment.
6.2.2.2 Average Plus Forwarding Scheme (A+FS)
In the basic scheme, each node making progress towards the destination is a potential next
hop. However, it is possible that the lowest bidder selected using the basic scheme may
make the least progress (among the potential next hops) towards the destination. Thus,
the basic forwarding scheme can increase the number of hops, resulting in a higher total
payment. Hence, it is desirable to reduce total cost as long as truthfulness is guaranteed.
If an auctioneer selects only those nodes making enough progress towards the destination
as qualified bidders, then the average hop count to the destination will be reduced. To
achieve this, an auctioneer calculates the average distance (AvgDst) over all neighboring
nodes that are closer to the destination than the auctioneer. It selects only nodes that make
greater progress more than AvgDst towards the destination as qualified bidders (QB′). The
bidder with the lowest bid in QB′ will win the auction. Its payment will be the second lowest
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the Average Plus Forwarding Scheme (A+FS).
bid in QB′. If there are less than two qualified nodes in QB′, then the auction fails. In such
a case, the auctioneer returns to the BaFS, i.e., sets all nodes making progress towards the
destination as the qualified bidder, and selects the lowest bidder as the winner.
Fig. 6.1 illustrates an example of A+FS. In the figure, F is the auctioneer and the dotted
circle denotes the radio range of F . R denotes the distance from F to destination D. Nodes
nk, k ∈ 1, · · · , 6 are the neighbors of F that are closer to the destination than F . The
dashed line denotes the AvgDst of these six nodes. Thus only nodes in the shadowed area,
n4, n5 and n6, are the qualified bidders (i.e., belong to QB
′). Among these nodes, n4 has
the lowest bid (12) and n6 has the second lowest bid (14). Thus n4 will be the winner of
the auction and gets a payment of 14.
6.2.2.3 Unit Price Bid
In both BaFS and A+FS, bidders quote their bids for sending a packet and the lowest
bidder wins the auction. An alternative way to bid in both schemes is to use the price of
unit progress as a criterion. In this case, the bidder asking the least price per unit progress
will be the winner. For example, in BaFS the auctioneer F selects all neighboring nodes
that make progress towards destination D as qualified bidders (QB). Based on the bid bi
value and progress (D(ni,D)−D(F,D)) of each node ni ∈ QB, F calculates the unit price
of each node ni as:
µi =
bi
(D(ni,D) −D(F,D))
.
The auctioneer F selects the node with the least µi, denoted as ns, as the next hop. The
payment to ns will be made according to the unit price instead of the bid for the packet. The
next hop node, ns, gets the unit payment as the second least unit price among QB, denoted
as µ′. Thus, the payment to the node ns per packet will be µ
′ ∗ (D(ns,D) −D(F,D)).
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6.3 Analysis of TGF
In this section, we first show that truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each node
for BaFS [57], A+FS and the unit price bid schemes. Second, we present an analysis of
progress made per hop for both BaFS and A+FS schemes.
6.3.1 Truthfulness of TGF
Theorem 6.3.1. In BaFS, bidding true cost is the dominant strategy for every qualified
bidder.
Proof. This proof is similar to that in Section 5.3.2. Suppose a bidder i with true cost vi
declares a bid bi. Let i’s utility be ui. We denote the minimum bid besides bi as m
−i, and
the distance between i and the destination D as Di. According to the auction rule, the
utility ui of a bidder is
ui =





m−i − vi, bi < m−i
m−i − vi, bi = m−i ∧ Di = min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}
0, bi > m
−i
There are two possibilities: Bidder i may over-bid or under-bid its cost vi [57].
Case of over-bidding: If the bid is higher than the cost, i.e., bi > vi, then there are
five possibilities:
1. If bi < m
−i, then i wins the auction and ui = m
−i − vi. However, i can get the same
payoff by bidding its cost vi.
2. If vi < m
−i < bi, then i loses the auction and gets zero payoff. However, by bidding
vi, it can get a positive payoff.
3. If m−i < vi, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it could have received by bidding vi.
4. If m−i = bi and Di = min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i gets the same payoff as by bidding vi.
5. If m−i = bi and Di 6= min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i loses the auction and gets zero payoff.
However, by bidding vi it can get a positive payoff.
Thus, i has no incentive for over-bidding.
Case of under-bidding: If the bid is lower than the cost, i.e., bi < vi, then there are
five possibilities:
1. If vi < m
−i, then i gets payoff m−i − vi, the same as it could have received by bidding
vi.
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2. If bi < m
−i < vi, then i gets a negative payoff as m
−i − vi < 0. However, by bidding
vi, i gets zero payment, which is better than a negative payoff.
3. If bi > m
−i, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it could have received by bidding vi.
4. If bi = m
−i and Di = min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i gets m−i − vi < 0. However, by bidding
vi, i gets zero payment, which is better than a negative payoff.
5. If bi = m
−i and Di 6= min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it could have
received by bidding vi.
Thus, i has no incentive for under-bidding.
In both the cases i’s dominant strategy is to bid its cost vi, and hence, the theorem.
Corollary 6.3.1. In A+FS, bidding the true cost is the dominant strategy for each node.
Proof. There are only two possibilities.
1. There is more than one node in QB′ (refer to the A+FS algorithm). Only nodes in
QB′ are qualified bidders. They may over-bid or under-bid their cost. However, from
Theorem 6.3.1, their dominant strategy is to bid their true cost.
2. There is at most one node in QB′. In this case, the auction for QB′ cannot be set
up. Thus the auctioneer sets up the auction as in BaFS. From Theorem 6.3.1, the
dominant strategy is to bid their true cost.
Theorem 6.3.2. In the unit price bid scheme along with BaFS, bidding the true cost is the
dominant strategy for each bidder.
Proof. Suppose a bidder i with true cost vi bids with a value bi, and i’s utility is ui. We
denote D(F,D)−D(i,D) as δi, where F is the position of the auctioneer, and the minimum
unit bid besides i as t−i. The utility of a node (qualified bidder) i is:
ui =





t−iδi − vi, viδi < t
−i
t−iδi − vi, viδi < t
−i ∧ Di = min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}
0, viδi > t
−i
Bidder i may over-bid or under bid its cost vi [57].
Case of over-bidding: The bid is higher than the cost, i.e., bi > vi, and therefore
there are five possibilities:
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1. If bi/δi < t
−i, then i wins the auction and gets the payoff as t−iδi − vi. However, i
can get the same payoff by bidding its cost vi.
2. If vi/δi < t
−i < bi/δi, then i loses the auction it should win and gets zero payoff. By
bidding vi, it can get a positive payoff.
3. If t−i < vi/δi, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it would have received by bidding
its cost vi.
4. If t−i = bi/δi and Di = min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i gets the same payoff as it would have
received by bidding vi.
5. If t−i = bi/δi and Di 6= min
∀j∈bidders
{Dj}, then i loses the auction it should win and gets
zero payoff. By bidding vi, it can get a positive payoff.
Thus, i has no incentive for over-bidding.
Case of under-bidding: The bid is lower than the cost, i.e., bi < vi, and there are
therefore five possibilities:
1. If vi/δi < t
−i, then i gets payoff t−iδi − vi, the same as it would have received by
bidding vi.
2. If bi/δi < t
−i < vi/δi, then i gets a negative payoff as t
−iδi − vi < 0. By bidding vi, i
gets zero payoff, which is better than a negative payoff.
3. If bi/δi > t
−i, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it would have received by bidding
vi.
4. If bi/δi = t
−i and Di = min
∀j∈bidder
{Dj}, then i gets t−iδi − vi < 0. By bidding vi, i gets
zero payoff, which is better than a negative payoff.
5. If bi/δi = t
−i and Di 6= min
∀j∈bidder
{Dj}, then i gets zero payoff, the same as it could
have received by bidding vi.
Thus, i has no incentive for under-bidding.
In both the cases i’s dominant strategy is to bid its cost vi, and hence the theorem.
Corollary 6.3.2. In the unit price bid scheme along with A+FS, bidding true cost is the
dominant strategy for each bidder.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 6.3.2 and Corollary 6.3.1 above.
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6.3.2 Average Progress Made Per Hop in BaFS
Intuitively, selecting the next hop towards a destination based on Euclidean distance makes
more sense than basing the choice on BaFS. However, greedy distance based forwarding
does not guarantee truthfulness. On the other hand, progress made per hop (towards
the destination) is another important design issue for forwarding algorithms. Thus, we
statistically analyze the average progress made per hop in BaFS.
In the basic scheme, a node F selects a neighbor with the lowest bid as the next hop.
Let N be the set of neighbors that are closer to destination D than F , such that m = |N |.
Let ξ be the random variable representing the next hop location. Then the expected next
hop location is:
Eξ =
m
∑
i=1
pili .
where pi is the probability that node i is selected as the next hop, and li is i’s location.
Since i’s cost is independent of its location, every node i ∈ N has the same probability of
being the lowest bidder. Thus pi is same for all i ∈ N . Thus,
Eξ =
1
m
m
∑
i=1
li .
If m is large enough, under the assumption of uniform distribution, discrete random variable
ξ can be considered as a continuous variable ξ′, then:
Eξ′ =
∫
lρ(l)dl .
where ρ(l) is the probability density function of location. One way to interpret this change
in variable is as follows: even though m is small, if such a next hop selection runs many
times, from the statistical point of view, it is reasonable to use the expected continuous
variable ξ′ to estimate the expectation of the discrete variable ξ.
The next question is how to calculate ξ′. Under the assumption of uniform distribution,
ξ′ is the center of geometry of the shaded area in Figure 6.2. In the figure, the line connecting
auctioneer F and destination D is set as the x-axis. Without loss of generality, let F be at
the origin (0,0), and D be at (R,0). Due to the symmetry of the upper and lower parts, ξ′
must be located on the x-axis, i.e., its y-coordinate equals zero. We denote the radio range
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Figure 6.2: The expected position of a next hop node.
of node F as r and the distance from F to D as R. ξ′’s x-coordinate is calculated as follows:
Eξ′x =
∫∫
FABCF xdxdy
∫∫
FABCF dxdy
=
∫
r2
2R
0 x
√
R2−(x−R)2dx+
∫ r
r2
2R
x
√
r2−x2dx
∫
r2
2R
0
√
R2−(x−R)2dx+
∫ r
r2
2R
√
r2−x2dx
.
(6.1)
As both F and ξ′ are on the x-axis, the average progress in BaFS is |Eξ′x |.
6.3.3 Average Progress Per Hop in A+FS
In A+FS only nodes making more progress than AvgDst will be qualified as bidders.
As shown in Fig. 6.2 above, only nodes in the enclosed area EBHGE can be potential
candidates for selection as the next hop. Statistically, the expectation of the next hop’s
position is the geometric center of the shaded area of EBHGE in Fig. 6.2, which can be
calculated in a similar way to the geometrical center of FABCF if we have G’s x-coordinate
(for convenience denoted as ∆). With uniform distribution, G is the geometry center of
area FABCF . Thus ∆ can be calculated from Equation 6.1. Using the value of ∆, the
expectation of the next hop’s x-coordinate can be calculated, in a similar way:
Eξ′x =
∫∫
EBHGE xdxdy
∫∫
EBHGE dxdy
=
∫ β
∆ x
√
(R−∆)2−(x−R)2dx+
∫ r
β x
√
r2−x2dx
∫ β
∆
√
(R−∆)2−(x−R)2dx+
∫ r
β
√
r2−x2dx
where β =
2∆R − ∆2 + r2
2R
.
(6.2)
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Thus the average progress made by A+FS is |Eξ′x |.
Table 6.1 shows the expected progress made using the BaFS and the A+FS with respect
to ratio of r/R.
r/R BaFS A+FS
2 0.466r 0.721r
3 0.453r 0.702r
4 0.446r 0.693r
5 0.442r 0.687r
6 0.439r 0.682r
Table 6.1: The expected progress made towards a destination
6.4 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of proposed schemes, we conducted extensive simulations using
GloMoSim [64]. Unless specified otherwise, the following parameters were used in the
simulations. 100 nodes were initially placed uniformly in an area of 600m by 1500m. Nodes
used a radio range of 250 meters, and picked a cost randomly between 10 and 30. All nodes
followed the Random Waypoint mobility model [65] with a maximum speed of 0 m/s to 10
m/s and a pause time of 30 seconds. Each simulation lasted for 900 seconds. To generate
traffic we simulated 10 CBR flows. Each flow sent four 512-byte data packets per second,
starting at 120 seconds and ending at 880 seconds. Nodes used the 802.11 protocol with
DCF as the MAC protocol. Data points represented on a graph were averaged over 10
simulation runs, each with a different seed. Simulations focus on five metrics, including
packet delivery ratio, average hop count, average end-to-end delay, overpayment ratio and
total payment, which is the total amount paid to all intermediate nodes.
TGF does not introduce any additional control packets in comparison to the pure
geographic forwarding algorithm. In both algorithms, the overhead is only due to the
Hello messages. TGF needs only one additional field (4 bytes) in each Hello message. The
overhead incurred by TGF is .66 Hello packet per node per second.
Since TGF is the first algorithm to address truthfulness in the context of geographic
forwarding, we compared results among the different schemes proposed. In the following
discussion and in the graphs, UiFS represents the unit price bid scheme along with BaFS,
and DIST represents distance-based greedy forwarding. Our simulation emphasizes the
effect of node mobility and the number of nodes on the proposed schemes.
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Figure 6.3: Performance of different schemes with respect to mobility.
6.4.1 Impact of Mobility
6.4.1.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
Fig. 6.3(a) shows packet delivery ratio with respect to maximum node speed. All four
schemes show almost identical behavior, and deliver more than 99% of packets. AT the
given node density, nodes in various schemes can find feasible next hops and forward packets
to destinations. As the mobility increases, the packet delivery ratio drops slightly. This
is because with the fixed Hello message interval, neighbor information is more likely to be
outdated. Thus, a supposed neighbor may have already moved out of radio range, resulting
in more packets being dropped.
6.4.1.2 Average Hop Count
Fig. 6.3(b) shows the average hop count for a packet to reach a destination with respect to
maximum node speed. We observe that different schemes result in different hop counts, with
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BaFS, A+FS, UiFS and DIST in descending order (highest to lowest hop counts). DIST
needs the lowest average hop count as it always selects the node closest to the destination as
the next hop. BaFS needs more hops than other schemes as it does not take into account the
progress (distance) when selecting the next hop. A+FS needs less hops than BaFS because
it selects a node that makes enough progress towards a destination as the next hop. In UiFS,
the closer a node is to the destination, the lesser its unit price, and the higher the probability
of the node being selected as the next hop. In other words, nodes making more progress
towards the destination are more likely (depending upon their bid value) to be selected
as the next hop. In all schemes, more hop counts are needed in a static network than in
a mobile network. This is because mobility randomizes the position of source-destination
pairs as well as the intermediate nodes, and increases network connectivity.
6.4.1.3 End-to-end Delay
Fig. 6.3(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to maximum node speed. We observe that
the performance of all schemes is similar to that in Fig. 6.3(b), and the curves are identical
to their corresponding parts: DIST has the shortest end-to-end delay, followed by UiFS,
then A+FS, with BaFS incurring the largest delay. This is because the more hops a packet
travels, the more delay it incurs. Nevertheless, the delay difference between various schemes
are negligible.
6.4.1.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 6.3(d) shows overpayment ratio with respect to maximum node speed. BaFS has the
lowest overpayment ratio since it always finds the lowest bidder and pays it with the second
lowest bid. A+FS has a slightly higher overpayment ratio than BaFS as the bidders in this
scheme constitute only a fraction of those in BaFS. UiFS incurs the highest overpayment
ratio. In UiFS, the second lowest unit price multiplying the distance and progress made
towards a destination, instead of the second lowest bid, will be paid to the winner. Thus,
the scheme incurs a higher rate of overpayment than the other schemes.
6.4.1.5 Total Payment
Fig. 6.4 shows total payment incurred with respect to maximum node speed. A+FS requires
the least total payment. Although its overpayment ratio is a little higher than that of BaFS,
it needs less hops. The decrease in average hop count outweighs the increase in overpayment
ratio, and thus the overall payment is less than the other two schemes. UiFS needs fewer
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Figure 6.4: The payment of different schemes with respect to mobility
hops but incurs a higher overpayment ratio, whereas BaFS incurs the lowest overpayment
ratio but needs the highest number of hops. Overall, UiFS and BaFS incur similar payments.
The above result shows that A+FS has a low end-to-end delay and incurs the least total
payment, and thus performs better than BaFS and UiFS from the point of view of source
nodes.
6.4.2 Impact of Node Density
6.4.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
Fig. 6.5(a) shows the packet delivery ratio with respect to node density, with a maximum
node speed of 6 m/s. All four schemes show almost identical behavior, and deliver more
than 99.4% of packets to their destination. DIST delivers a slightly fewer packets than the
other three schemes. This is because DIST always selects the node closest to the destination,
and is more likely to be far away from the sender than those selected by other schemes.
Under mobile scenarios, such nodes are more likely to move out of the sender’s radio range,
resulting in more packets being dropped.
6.4.2.2 Average Hop Count
Fig. 6.5(b) shows its average hop count for a packet to reach the destination with respect
to node density, with a maximum node speed of 6 m/s. We observe that different schemes
result in different average hop counts, for reasons discussed in Section 6.4.1.2. As the node
density increases, the average hop count incurred by DIST, A+FS and UiFS change little
whereas that incurred by BaFS decreases by a small amount.
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Figure 6.5: Performance of different schemes with respect to node density.
6.4.2.3 Average End-to-end Delay
Fig. 6.5(c) shows end-to-end delay with respect to the node density, with a maximum node
speed of 6 m/s. As node density increases, the end-to-end delay increases a little for all
four schemes. With a fixed Hello message interval, an increase in the number of nodes
incurs more Hello messages, resulting in more contention for the radio channel. Thus,
data messages are likely to need more time to attain a channel, resulting in a longer delay.
Nevertheless, all these end-to-end delays are very low, as the longest one is only 0.063
seconds.
6.4.2.4 Overpayment Ratio
Fig. 6.5(d) shows overpayment ratio with respect to node density, with a maximum node
speed of 6 m/s. As node density increases, the overpayment ratio decreases for all three
auction-based schemes, and in particular for BaFS. With a fixed cost range, an increase in
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nodes is more likely to decrease the cost difference between the best bid and the second
best bid, i.e., the second best bid is more likely to be close to the best bid.
6.4.2.5 Total Payment
Fig. 6.6 shows the total payment incurred with respect to node density, with a maximum
node speed of 6 m/s. A+FS incurs the least payment, UiFS incurs a higher payment, and
BaFS incurs the highest payment. For an analysis of the reason for this, see Section 6.4.1.5.
As node density increases, the total payment decreases for all the three schemes. Within
a fixed cost range, the greater the number of nodes (bidders), the higher the probability
that the second best bid is close to the best bid, i.e., the second best bid is more likely to
decrease as node density increases. As payment is determined by the second best bid, total
payment will decrease.
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Figure 6.6: Payment of different schemes with respect to node density
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented TGF, a truthful protocol for geographic routing in mobile
ad hoc networks with selfish nodes. TGF uses the auction-based forwarding schemes, BaFS,
A+FS and unit price bid scheme that selects a next hop based on the winner of the auction.
To stimulate nodes ooperation, all BaFS, A+FS and unit price bid schemes provide incentive
to nodes to forward packets correctly, and to prevent nodes from cheating over their cost.
We have theoretically proved that all three schemes guarantee truthfulness, i.e., nodes
maximize their utilities only when they reveal their true cost. We also statistically analyze
the average progress made per hop for BaFS and A+FS. Our simulation results show that
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these schemes provide a high packet delivery ratio and have a low average hop count and
low end-to-end delay without compromising overpayment to the nodes.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, node-cooperation problem in mobile ad hoc networks with selfish nodes
were addressed. We explored several methods to solve this problem.
First we applied the methodology of punishing uncooperative nodes to enforce cooper-
ation. By resorting to neighbor monitoring technology, a fair and distributed solution to
detect, punish and readmit selfish nodes was presented. It emphasized providing nodes with
equal opportunities to serve, and be served by others, and introduced credit as a metric for
evaluating node contribution to the network. The solution greatly mitigated the location
privilege problem. We further presented a light-weight detection-based solution considering
battery status. This solution requires neighbor monitoring only when necessary, and nodes
working in the promiscuous mode only part-time, thereby reducing the overhead and saving
battery life. A voting system was introduced in both solutions to avoid the necessity
of a centralized server. This system can also solve the inconsistent evaluation problem.
Simulation results showed that both solutions could catch selfish node very effectively, incur
low overhead and improve network performance significantly.
We then explored the methodology of rewarding nodes, specifically mechanism design
methods, to motivate selfish but rational nodes to forward packets to other nodes. A
low overhead truthful routing protocol (LOTTO) was first presented. It rewards nodes
according to their individual cost, which may be different even for the same node according
to its different neighbors. In LOTTO, we introduced a simple and effective way to collect
the topological information of a network. Based on this, LOTTO can find least cost paths
from source nodes to destination nodes. By applying the VCG mechanism, this protocol
guarantees that nodes get enough payments and have no incentive to cheat over their
cost. The most prominent feature of LOTTO is that it reduces the message overhead from
O(n3) [33] to O(n2) and greatly mitigates message congestion and queue overflows in the
MAC layer. Thus it has a much better performance than ad hoc-VCG.
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We conducted extensive simulation studies for LOTTO, as well as for our other solutions
and algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct an extensive
simulation study for mechanism design methods to evaluate important network metrics such
as packet delivery ratio, overhead and end-to-end delay. Our simulation results showed that
LOTTO greatly outperforms ad hoc-VCG.
We further presented a light-weight scalable truthful routing protocol (LSTOP). It
requires partial topological information of a network and incurs a very low overhead of
O(n) on average and O(n2) in the worst case. LSTOP provides near-least-cost paths and
even least-cost paths with a high probability in dense networks. Simulation results showed
that LSTOP achieves far a better network performance when compared to ad-hoc VCG as
it generates 30-50 times less overhead, results in 2 orders of magnitude lower end-to-end
delay and delivers far more packets. Moreover, it greatly reduces overall cost, and thus
makes mechanism design method significant.
We also presented a generic mechanism, GTMR, that can turn any table-driven multiple
routing protocol into a truthful one. By applying an auction mechanism to packet
forwarding, GTMR stimulates nodes to show their true cost. Furthermore, a truthful
multipath routing protocol (TMRP), as an example of GTMR, was presented. TMRP
is derived from a well-known AOMDV protocol and incurs only 2n overhead in route
discovery, without introducing new types of control messages. By far, this is the least
overhead incurred in any truthful routing protocol. TMRP can also achieve load balancing
without compromising truthfulness.
The selfish nodes problem, as related to location-based routing protocols is addressed
here. A truthful geographic forwarding protocol (TGF) was presented. TGF utilizes three
auction-based forwarding schemes to stimulate node cooperation. In all schemes the next
hop node is typically the winner of the auction. We theoretically proved the truthfulness of
all three schemes, and showed their performance through simulation studies. Also shown
is a statistical analysis of the average progress made per hop for the two schemes. TGF is
the first algorithm to address truthfulness in the context of geographic forwarding.
7.2 Future Work
The selfish-node problem is still an active research area and there are still many unanswered
questions. In the following section, directions and areas for further research are outlined.
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7.2.1 Detecting Byzantine Selfish Behavior
In the fair distributed and light-weight solutions, as well as other detection-based solutions,
it is assumed that selfish behavior is straightforward, i.e., a node may behave selfishly from
the very beginning or at a random moment. Once behaving selfishly, it continues until
being detected. However, a selfish node may behave more subtly. It may behave selfishly
for some time and then behave cooperatively, then selfishly again. Such behavior is termed
byzantine selfish behavior. We propose the following scheme as a tentative solution to
detect byzantine selfish behavior.
Each node is assigned agents. The agents’ IDs can be acquired by applying a pre-defined
hash function to the node’s ID. So every node can know its own agents and those of other
nodes. A node’s agents are used to record the lifetime of packet forwarding information of
the client node. Suppose node A is selected as an intermediate node for a data flow. Node
P and node N are node A’s upstream node and down stream node, respectively. P and N
should report the number of packets forwarded to A, Pktfwd, and received from A, Pktrcvd,
to A’s agents, respectively. Reporting will be invoked in two cases. In the first case, the
data flow through A completes normally. Suppose a node can determine whether the flow is
complete or not. At the end of the flow, P and N report the corresponding packet number
to A’s agents. A should also report its forwarding statistics, Pktrcvdself and Pkt
fwd
self , to its
agents. In the second case, upon finding the link to N broken, A sends an RERR message
to the source. Upon receiving the RERR, the upstream node P reports the number of
packets forwarded from A to A’s agents. Also, N will report the number of packets received
from A upon timeout of a certain timer. Meanwhile, A reports its forwarding statistics to
its agents.
Upon receiving reports from the upstream node P and downstream node N of a client
node A, an agent R adds Pktfwd and Pktrcvd to Pkt
acc
fwd and Pkt
acc
rcvd, respectively, where
Pktaccfwd is the total number of packets sent to node A and Pkt
acc
rcvd is the total number
of packets received by A’s downstream node(s). Also, R calculates the accumulated self-
declared number of packets from A, Pktaccself . The agent checks if the deviation between
Pktaccfwd, Pkt
acc
rcvd and Pkt
acc
self is beyond a certain threshold. If it is, it convicts the client
node as a selfish node.
A node will be equipped with multiple agents. Using multiple agents can mitigate
the dropping of reports containing the forwarding statistics of the client node. It can
also enhance reliability and robustness. The distribution scheme of agents should be well
designed and takes the following issues into consideration. The first issue is the location
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of agents. An agent close to a client is more likely to receive all reports. The second
issue is node mobility, which may change initial layout substantially . The third issue
is the number of agents. More agents provide more robustness against report dropping
(intentionally by selfish nodes, or unintentionally due to collision). However, having more
agents incurs a higher overhead for reporting. A possible solution to this is to distribute
agents hierarchically, as in GLS [89] and DLM [90]. In such a scheme, a node will have lg N
agents, where N is the number of nodes in the network.
7.2.2 Detection-based Cost-efficient Method
Detection-based methods are combined with conventional routing algorithms such as DSR
or AODV, where cost-efficiency is not a consideration. Due to limited battery life, which is
the main reason for selfish behavior, it is necessary to use battery efficiently. Researchers
have focused on this issue and proposed quite a few algorithms to reduce overall power
consumption or to extend the life of the network [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97]. These
solutions use some metrics related to emitting power or power consumption information.
However, it is almost impossible to accurately check if a node lies about such information,
unless a truthful protocol is used. Thus some questions are raised. Is it possible to find a
detection-based cost efficient method for selfish-node problem? Although they are based on
incompatible philosophies, can we combine the detection-based method and the motivation-
based method?
7.2.3 Truthful Mechanism Prevention of Node Collusion
The VCG mechanism is truthful. However, it cannot prevent the collusion of nodes, i.e., it
is not group-strategyproof. A mechanism is group-strategyproof if not lying about its cost is
its dominant strategy even if agents collude. Informally, a group-strategyproof mechanism
requires that “if any agent in the group benefits from the group’s collusion and lying to the
mechanism, then at least one agent will lose benefit”[98]. Finding a group-strategyproof
and cost-efficient mechanism is a challenge.
7.2.4 Truthful Mechanism Based on Cryptography
Mitchell et al. [99] observed that if we apply cryptography to every message received and
sent in an Autonomous System on the Internet, then all forms of cheating can be detected.
Feigenbaum and Shenker [98] provided some open questions using such a cryptography
mechanism in a BGP protocol. Such an observation and open questions should be applicable
to MANET. One question is “Can a protocol detect all forms of cheating without using
104
public key infrastructure?” [98]. Salem et al. [44] proposed a charging and rewarding scheme
in multi-hop cellular networks. The scheme uses symmetrical cryptography to assist in
rewarding honesty. However, it is inherent in the scheme, with the help of base stations,
that all forwarding nodes get the same reimbursement. With different reimbursements
to different nodes, the question remains whether cryptography alone can help to prevent
cheating.
7.2.5 Payment Management
A complete motivation-based solution should include a payment scheme and a money
management mechanism in charge of (virtual) money crediting and transferring. These
two components are decoupled so that they are tractable. Most researchers in the literature
focus on how to design an effective payment scheme according to different criteria, assuming
an existing payment management mechanism. Only two schemes have been proposed for
payment management, and both have limitations. The first solution [58, 45] assumes there
is a centralized service. Nodes report their credits to the central server (or Banker node)
when they are connected to it. The banker node manages the accounting of all nodes.
Such a centralized service can be provided in an ad hoc network that works as an edge
network of a cellular network or by access points. However, typically centralized service is
not available in an ad hoc network. Thus a distributed payment management mechanism is
required. Another solution [42] assumes there is a secure module which is independent of a
node (user) and is tamper-proof. This hardware module can determine payment correctly
and fairly. For economic reasons, it is difficult to attach such a hardware module to each
node in the network.
To deploy a motivation method for the selfish-node problem in practice, a feasible
payment management mechanism is a prerequisite. On designing such a mechanism, the
following issues should be considered.
• Who assumes the responsibility of accounting and transferring credit? In edge
networks, access points or base stations are natural choices. However, for other ad
hoc networks, no single node can work as an accounting server. A possible solution is
to distribute the responsibility to a subset of nodes, as in the threshold cryptography
key management scheme [100]. As discussed in [101], such a task sharing scheme
is not suitable for civilian networks, since nodes in these networks are selfish, and
have no interest in taking on added responsibilities. However, with additional awards,
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these nodes may have the incentives to do such a job. One issue for such a distributed
solution is that it should not incur a high overhead.
• How is the credit to be accounted for? This does not pose a problem in a single server
scheme. However, in a distributed scheme, accounting coordination is an important
issue due to possible loss of payment-related control messages.
• What should the money format be? How can it be turned into real currency?
Intuitively, virtual currency should be introduced for virtual money circulation. Such
virtual currency could be official tokens signed by certain authorities.
• When is money paid? The money can be distributed immediately at the end of the
forwarding service, or upon request.
Copyright c© Yongwei Wang 2008
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